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1	From. The Secy to the Hon'ble the Resident D.O. No. F. 555-39 G & S dt 10th Octr. forwarding for information a copy of the pamphlet. Subd for perusal. & Returning. G 13/10 NM 12/10/39 G 14/10
2	From The Secy to the Hon'ble the Resident Fr. a copy of the publication "How Hitler Made The War Subd for perusal G 15/1

NOTE—Contn. Sheet.

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The reply to this communication should be addressed to the Secretary to the Resident in Mysore, Bangalore, by designation and not by name.

D. Dis. No. F. 555-39
G. & A.

2464/F

FROM

THE SECRETARY TO THE HON'BLE THE RESIDENT IN MYSORE

To

The Chief Secretaary to the Government of
His Highness the Maharja of Mysore,
Bangalore.

CS (War)
CHIEF SECRETARY
10 OCT. 1939
GOVT. OF MYSORE.

Dated Bangalore, the 10th October 1939.

Pamphlet entitled "A summary of Important matters concerning the Defence Services in India, 1938-39.

SIR,

I am directed to forward for information a copy of the pamphlet noted above.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

for SECRETARY TO THE RESIDENT.

NS

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A Summary of Important Matters concerning the Defence Services in India 1938-39.

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A SUMMARY OF IMPORTANT MATTERS CONCERNING THE DEFENCE SERVICES IN INDIA, 1938-39.

CHAPTER I.

General.

1. *Object.*—In the course of a debate in the Legislative Assembly on the 6th March 1934, the Defence Secretary promised to consider the possibility of producing annually for the benefit of the Members of the Central Legislature an account of the chief activities of the Defence Services during the previous 12 months. In the following pages, a brief description of the more important measures put into effect during the period 1st April 1938 to the 31st March 1939 are given.

It is hoped that the information contained therein will prove of interest and of use to Members.

2. *Duties of the armed forces.*—Armed forces are maintained by the Government of India for the defence of India against external aggression and for the maintenance of internal peace and tranquillity.

The following constitutes a brief description of the functions of each defence service :—

(*i*) *Royal Indian Navy.*—

For the safety of her sea communications, India depends on protection by the Royal Navy, to co-operate with which she maintains a squadron of small sea-going vessels capable of dealing with small raiding warships of hostile armed merchantmen.

The primary function of the Royal Indian Navy is, however, to provide for local naval defence, *i.e.*, to protect shipping against light surface craft, mines and submarines in Indian ports and harbours and in the immediate approaches thereto.

(*ii*) *Army.*—

Land forces maintained by the Government of India are divided into the following main categories :—

(*a*) Frontier Defence troops, for the defence of the Western Frontier and for the control of the tribes within the Durand Line.

(*b*) Internal Security troops, to support the Civil power in the maintenance of law and order and to guard the main arteries of communication in India.

(*c*) Coast Defence troops, to undertake the local defence of the principal ports in War.

(*d*) Air Defence Troops, to provide ground defence against hostile air attack.

(*e*) The General Reserve, to be used in the defence of India as a whole as circumstances may demand, and to reinforce the troops in the previous categories as necessary.

(*iii*) *Air Forces in India.*—

The duties of the Air Forces in India include co-operation with the other defence services in the control of tribes on the Western Frontier and in the defence of India against attack across her land frontiers or coast line.

In addition, the Air Forces are prepared to act independently of the other services in these tasks.

3. *Necessity for modernization.*—

Since the Great War, research and experiment have produced new and more powerful weapons. The development of armoured and unarmoured mechanical vehicles has shown the paramount need to eliminate horsed cavalry and animal traction and transport except where it is necessary to retain them for use in areas unsuitable to movement by mechanized forces.

Since 1934, when the process of modernization may be said to have begun in earnest in other armies, the resultant changes have appreciably affected the theory and practice of warfare and it has become increasingly apparent that those armies which do not adopt new weapons, equipments and means of mobility, will be placed in war at a most serious disadvantage.

The prospect of a future world war shows clearly that India cannot base the organization and equipment of her forces solely on potential operations in defence of her land frontier, though this task alone demands considerable re-equipment both to guard against the new weapons which will be used and to enable the fullest advantage to be taken of scientific and mechanical developments. There is an evident possibility that the security of India's sea frontiers and trade may be threatened, in which contingency it may well be essential to deny or deprive the enemy of bases in adjacent countries without which hostile naval vessels would be unable to operate for long in Indian waters. Opposition from the most highly modernized forces may then be encountered.

This brief survey should be sufficient to show that all forces of the Army in India must keep pace with modern military progress. The problem will be further discussed in Chapter II.

4. *Events leading up to the institution of the Chatfield Committee.*—It will be realized that the expense involved, not only in the initial outlay on modernization measures but in providing all possible sources of supply and maintenance within the borders of India, is enormous, running into many crores of rupees.

On the other hand, the demands of Defence are regulated by the amount of money that can be made available. Although during the last few years the world situation has progressively worsened, our net Defence expenditure has been reduced from 55 crores in 1929 to approximately 46. If this amount is accepted as the limit justifiable by India's financial resources, the problem is how to obtain a higher degree of mobility, and the greater striking and

defensive power conferred by modern armaments, including tanks and their antidotes, aircraft and anti-aircraft guns, anti-gas protection, mechanized transport and other essentials for modern warfare, without exceeding that sum.

It was to discuss this problem and its solution that General Sir Ivo Vesey, Chief of the General Staff, accompanied by Air Marshal Joubert de la Ferte, Air Officer Commanding, and other officers proceeded to London in April 1938. The need for early action to place the defence organization of India on a satisfactory basis was recognized and accepted. It was not possible in the time available to reach agreement on all matters but an offer was made by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, subject to the approval of Parliament, to increase by £500,000 with effect from the 1st April 1939, the annual grant of £ 1,500,000 which has been paid to the Government of India since 1933 in aid of Indian Defence expenditure. In addition, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom proposed to ask Parliament to authorise the offer to the Government of India of a capital grant upto £5,000,000 for the re-equipment of certain British and Indian units in India and, in addition, to authorise the provision of aircraft for the re-equipment of certain squadrons of the Royal Air Force. It was also agreed that four British Battalions should be transferred from the Indian to the Imperial Government and this was carried out before the end of 1938.

5. *Chatfield Committee.*—An expert body of enquiry known as the Chatfield Committee was consequently set up to proceed to India to investigate the military and financial aspects of the problem on the spot and to submit a report before discussions between the two Governments were carried to their conclusion.

The terms of reference allotted to this Committee were as follows :—

> " Having regard to the increased cost of modern armaments, to the desirability of organizing, equipping and maintaining the forces in India in accordance with modern requirements, to the limited resources available in India for defence expenditure, to examine and report, in the light of experience gained in executing the British rearmament programme how these resources could be used to the best advantage and to make recommendations ".

The Committee was composed as follows :—

Chairman.

Admiral of the Fleet Lord CHATFIELD, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.V.O.

Members.

Sir ERNEST STROHMENGER, G.B.E., C.B.

Lieut.-General Sir BERTRAM N. SERGISON BROOKE, K.C.V.O., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

Air Vice Marshal C. L. COURTNEY, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.

Major General C. J. E. AUCHINLECK, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., O.B.E.

Secretary.

Mr. S. K. BROWN, C.B., C.V.O. (India Office).

Assistant Secretary.

Mr. M. J. DEAN of the Air Ministry.

The Committee was assisted by the following :—

Paymaster Captain R. C. JERRAM, C.B.E., D. S. O., who acted as Private Secretary to Lord Chatfield.

Mr. A. J. NEWLING, M.V.O., T.D. of the Finance Department, War Office.

Major P. R. ANTROBUS, M.C., R.E., of the General Staff, Army Headquarters (India), Staff Officer attached to the Committee during their stay in India.

The Committee assembled at Delhi early in November where witnesses were examined. After visits to the Frontier and Calcutta, the Committee completed their work and returned to Great Britain early in March. Their report is still under the consideration of His Majesty's Government.

CHAPTER. II.

MODERNIZATION.

6. The remarks in the previous Chapter on the necessity for modernization were there inserted primarily for the purpose of indicating the sequence of events which led to the appointment of the Chatfield Committee. Some amplification of the brief survey contained in paragraph 3 of Chapter I may, however, be of interest.

7. *Review of recent developments* ex-*India*.—It is common knowledge that during the last few years, the energies of all first class powers have been devoted to the re-arming and re-equipping of their forces on modern lines.

In general, the cavalry has forsaken the horse for the tank, the armoured car or for other armoured and un-armoured vehicles dependent on the task which each unit is designed to fulfil. Artillery is re-arming with more powerful, accurate and longer range weapons drawn almost invariably by mechanical traction. Engineers are acquiring power tools and are fully motorised. Recent developments in wireless telegraphy and radio telephony have revolutionized signal equipment, while the infantry, in addition to being re-armed with modern offensive and defensive weapons, has been provided with mechanized transport and is no longer regarded as an arm confined to movement on foot. The tremendous strides in the speed and range of aircraft have not only demanded the complete re-equipment of air forces but have necessitated corresponding changes in the methods, weapons and strengths of anti-aircraft defences. Developments in the design and armament of naval vessels have entailed no lesser alterations to coast defence equipments.

8. *Reaction on India.*—For a few years India could be content to watch the greater part of these developments, partly because her military problems did not then render modernization and mechanization so pressing, and partly because insuperable financial limitations would not allow her to indulge in experiment. During this period, however, a beginning was made, and gradual progress towards modernization has been steadily effected.

Later, however, changes in the international situation as well as further developments in the technique of mechanised armaments made it clear that, wherever they may operate, troops of the Army in India might be required to face new weapons of superior range and power which, moreover, are capable of being moved at high speed from point to point, and that the situation no longer admitted of a parochial consideration of India's defence problems. In this connection it may be observed that even countries adjacent to India are being forced to acquire modern weapons partly as a measure of self defence and partly on account of their inability to purchase further supplies of their existing equipments from abroad. For the past two and a half years, therefore, the problem of modernizing and mechanizing India's army in the best and most economical way, having due regard to Indian needs and conditions, has been occupying the earnest attention of the military authorities. Complete and considered plans have been prepared, and a substantial degree of ordered progress has already been achieved towards the goal, which is that all elements, British and Indian, of the Defence Forces in India must, provided always that due consideration is given to special local conditions such as those which obtain on the North-West Frontier, be put on a level with the forces of any possible enemy.

9. *Cost of Modernization.*—The provision of our forces with modern equipment necessarily involves a heavy initial outlay, and in this connection the following figures may be of interest :—

	Lakhs.
3·7″ Anti-aircraft—2 gun section	3·82
A light tank (tracked)	1·06
An armoured car	·3
A bomber aircraft	2·6
An army co-operation aircraft	1·7
A 25-pounder gun	·54
An escort vessel R. I. N.	47·00

10. *Supply problem involved.*—The provision of the necessary arms and equipment involved by the adoption of modernization presents an enormous problem. India is not yet a highly industrialised country, and supplies from overseas are liable to interception. It is therefore essential, both from an economic and military point of view, that all possible sources of supply within India should be explored and developed.

It must be remembered, however, that the manufacture of arms and modern military equipment, to say nothing of aircraft and warships, is a highly specialised industry, while the resources of India capable of being devoted to such supply are at present unfortunately limited. Any attempt to expand suddenly must be fraught with unexpected difficulties and disappointments. This matter is being investigated by the Principal Supply Officers' Committee (India), whose activities are described in Chapter IX.

11. Every possible step, however, is being taken to obtain requirements from within India's borders, though, as will be appreciated, details cannot be disclosed in a public document.

CHAPTER III.

Operations and use of Troops.

(*See sketch map—Appendix II.*)

12. *Operations in Waziristan, April 1938—March 1939.*—The period under review in the last summary closed with an account of the steps taken to force the Madda Khel to control the Faqir of Ipi, or to expel him from their country. These were successful for the time being, but further action for the same reasons had to be taken against the Madda Khel between April and June 1938 and also in the spring of 1939.

Waziristan as a whole remained in an unsettled state, and a series of incidents, mostly at the instigation of the Faqir, continued to take place throughout a large part of the ensuing year.

13. On the 14th April, after a hard fought action, a force of South Waziristan Scouts, supported by aircraft dispersed a gang of about 150 Mahsuds under the notorious irreconcilable Mullah Sher Ali in the Dargai Sar area to the west of Jandola and air action, after due warning, was taken against portions of Mahsud territory who had given shelter to Sher Ali's gang.

14. In North Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi who had been sheltering in the Kharre Area, a mountainous locality in proximity to the Afghan border and lying east of Madda Khel country, raised a "lashkar" of several hundred tribesmen, with three guns of tribal manufacture. The Tochi Scouts post at Datta Khel and the Khassadar post on the Lwargi Narai were attacked. Operations against this hostile body began on the 2nd June with an advance from Razani towards Mamirogha, and by the 6th June the enemy, who had been severely handled in several engagements, were greatly diminished in strength, though not entirely dispersed.

During the remainder of June, the Faqir of Ipi, continued to organize hostilities against Government. By early in July he again collected a considerable body of tribesmen with which he threatened the posts and communications in the Upper Tochi Valley. This "lashkar" was dispersed by operations which lasted from the 10th to the 19th July, in which troops, Tochi Scouts, and Royal Air Force units each played their part. The Faqir fled before the troops arrived, and a considerable portion of his resources in rifles, ammunition and supplies were captured.

The success of this operation ensured a period of comparative quiet in North Waziristan.

15. Early in June information was received indicating that two religious leaders, or "Pirs", were conspiring to unite the Mahsuds, Wazirs, and the Ghilzais (Afghan subjects), with a view to hostile action against the Afghan Government. One of these "Pirs" was quickly removed from Waziristan. The other, known as the "Shami Pir", a foreigner from Damascus, having previously concealed his intentions, suddenly revealed them at a large tribal meeting on the 13th June, when he persuaded many tribesmen to follow his leadership into Afghanistan. On the 23rd June he began his move towards the Afghan border.

Warnings were issued at once by Government to restrain the Mahsuds and Wazirs from accompanying the Shami Pir, and continuous air patrols were established to observe any move towards the frontier. The patrolling aircraft were heavily fired on on several occasions and were obliged to take retaliatory action. As a result of this and of political pressure, the Shami Pir's followers began to dwindle in strength and parties of disheartened tribesmen returned to their villages. The Shami Pir realising that his movement had failed, surrendered to Government, under safe conduct, and was deported from the country.

16. During July, Mullah Sher Ali and his gang of Mahsuds again took the field in South Waziristan. On the 11th July he attacked the South Waziristan Post at Splitoi without success, and was subsequently taught a sharp lesson in engagements with the South Waziristan Scouts near Sararogha Post on the 13th July, and Ladha Post on the 18th July. After due warning air action was again taken against certain Bahlolzai Mahsud villages who had been guilty of harbouring Sher Ali's gang.

17. Hostile acts at the instigation of the Faqir of Ipi, now started in a fresh area. A gang, under one Mehr Dil an outlaw, based on the precipitous Junighar Hills in the Ahmadzai Wazir salient, to the north of Bannu, made raids on villages in the Bannu and Kohat Districts and on traffic on the Bannu-Kohat road.

From the middle of June onwards, troops and civil armed forces, supported by aircraft when necessary, were employed to protect the road between Bannu and Kohat, and to guard against raiders.

On the night of the 23rd/24th July, Mehr Dil's gang, reinforced by local sympathisers and bad characters, raided Bannu city. Property was looted and houses and shops were burnt. Fighting with police, Frontier Constabulary and troops in Bannu City continued for about an hour before the raiders were ejected. The gang dispersed over a wide area rendering pursuit during the hours of darkness difficult.

With the object of deterring gangs from using the Ahmadzai Wazir salient as a base for raiding, after due warning tactical air proscription was imposed on the whole area from the 31st July to the 26th August. No raiding from the salient took place after the 12th August.

18. In September it became necessary to use the Razmak-Wana road for the passage of stores, and the Razmak and Wana Columns were employed for this purpose. They were opposed by Mullah Sher Ali and his gang which were dispersed after a sharp engagement with troops and aircraft on the 12th September. As a result Mullah Sher Ali remained inactive for a considerable period.

Later in September, three columns of Tochi and South Waziristan Scouts entered the Bannu Ahmadzai Wazir Salient, to deal with raiders who were again harbouring there. They were supported by aircraft, while Frontier Constabulary blocked the exits from the Salient. The very precipitous nature of the country made movement difficult, but the operation was successfully carried out and, for the time being, raiding across the Kohat-Bannu road practically ceased.

19. By the end of October the annual migration of the tribes to their winter locations had taken place. The failure of the Tori Khel to control their bad characters, who had been responsible for raids and kidnappings, made it necessary to bring pressure on certain sections of the tribe by denying them the use of their winter grazing grounds.

Except for attacks on civilian traffic and minor outrages by gangs who were in close touch with the Faqir, November passed quietly.

On the other hand raiding into the settled districts increased, accompanied by casualties to civilians and kidnappings.*

Pressure was maintained on the Tori Khel and in consequence tribal approaches were made to hostile leaders to induce them to make their peace with Government; these were unsuccessful.

20. In December there was recrudescence of hostile activity in South Waziristan on the part of the Manzai Mahsuds to the west of Kotkai. In order to support the maliks, this area was visited by the Razmak and Wana Columns. During the march of the Razmak Column there was some minor opposition, and the Shabi Khel Mahsuds, within whose limits this opposition occurred, were subsequently punished by fines. The movement through Manzai Mahsud country was unopposed and all the hostile agitators were either surrendered or satisfactory settlements made for their future good behaviour.

21. The Faqir of Ipi had for some time been sheltering in Madda Khel Wazir country, in contravention of the undertaking given by that tribe earlier in the year. Some weeks were allowed to elapse in order to judge the effect of tribal approaches, which, as stated above, proved unsuccessful. Owing to the lack of response to these approaches, pressure was brought to bear by air action, after due warning, on the villages and sections harbouring him. By this means he was kept continually on the move and prevented from re-establishing a headquarter from which to organize further hostilities.

22. During January pressure was maintained by air action on those sections of the Madda Khel Wazirs who were known to have harboured the Faqir.

Pressure on the Tori Khel was intensified and a column of troops entered the Lower Khaisora valley.

A blockade, carried out mainly by civil armed forces, was imposed on the Ahmadzai Wazir Salient whence raids had again had their origin.

There was a marked increase in the incidence of kidnapping and raiding in the settled districts bordering Waziristan.

23. Early in February there was some deterioration of the situation owing, in all probability, to propaganda that had been spread by the Faqir of Ipi and his chief supporters with the intention of reviving hostilities on a larger scale. In particular the attitude of the Madda Khel Wazirs became unsatisfactory and a "lashkar" assembled and attacked Datta Khel post. Owing,

* During the year there were 48 raids into Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan Districts alone; 80 persons were kidnapped and 13 killed.

however, to lack of success and the subsequent onset of severe weather conditions the majority of the tribesmen dispersed after a few days of hostile activity in the area. On 26th February, air blockade and other measures were instituted against the Madda Khel.

Raiding into the districts of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan diminished.

24. The air blockade of the Madda Khel Wazirs had a good effect. Early in March tribal representatives presented themselves in a submissive mood, and by the end of March the tribe appeared to be making genuine efforts to obtain a general compliance with the terms announced to them. They complied early in April and the blockade was accordingly raised.

Proscriptive air action and blockade measures continued against the Tori Khel Wazirs. During the month troops operated in the Khaisora and Shaktu valleys. There was some sharp fighting in the Shaktu valley in the course of which the tribesmen who had assembled sustained a number of casualties.

Blockade action against the Ahmadzai Wazirs brought about the expulsion of the outlaw Mehr Dil from the Ahmadzai Wazir Salient.

The Faqir of Ipi who since January had remained in Afghan territory a short distance across the Durand Line continued in his efforts to foment trouble, but his propaganda did not result in any considerable addition to the number of hostile gangs.

25. It is idle to attempt any prediction of the course events are likely to follow in Waziristan. At the end of the period under review conditions remained disturbed but were showing definite signs of improvement. Raiding into settled districts was still prevalent. There are indications that the restoration of a state of tranquillity in Waziristan is genuinely wished for by many of the hitherto hostile tribesmen.

26. *Cost.*—

The cost of the land and air operations between 1st April 1938 and 31st March 1939 is estimated at 45 Lakhs.

27. *Casualties.*—

The casualties incurred during the period by the forces engaged were as under :—

	Regular Forces.	
	Killed or died of wounds.	Wounded.
British Officers	3	3
Viceroy's Commissioned Officers ..	1	8
British Other Ranks	5	17*
Indian Other Ranks	50	178
Followers	3	5

* Includes 1 R. A. F.

	Civil Armed Forces.	
	Killed or died of wounds.	Wounded.
British Officers	1	1
Viceroy's Commissioned Officers ..	..	2
Indian Other Ranks	16	49

Civilian Followers.	
Killed.	Wounded.
3	1

28. *Troops called up in Aid of the Civil Power.*—During the year under review, troops were called upon to 'stand to' for internal security duties in aid of the Civil Power in the Provinces, on 45 occasions, as compared with a total of 23 in 1937/38 and 19 in 1936/37.

Of these 45 occasions, on 19 the troops were actually 'called out' for periods of time varying from a few hours to several days, as compared with four such occasions in each of the two previous years.

Except for two occasions when the troops called upon were detachments of the Auxiliary Force, the call was made upon regular troops.

The following table shows the number of times troops were called upon in each Province.

	Total number of times troops 'stood by'.	Total number of times troops were actually 'called out
United Provinces	26	10
Delhi	6	1
Punjab	4	2
Bengal	2	2
Bihar	2	2
N. W. F. Province	2	2
Bombay	2	[illegible]
Central Provinces	1	[illegible]
Assam, Madras, Orissa and Sind ..	[illegible]	[illegible]
	45	19

29. *Troops called out in Aid of Indian States.*—During the year under review, it was found necessary on a number of occasions to despatch regular troops, both British and Indian, into certain States for the purpose of the restoration of law and order. This was not found necessary in 1936/37 nor in 1937/38.

Troops proceeded to and remained in the Eastern States for periods as follows :—

Dhenkanal, Talcher and Ranpur.—One company of a British battalion for 10 days in September.

One company of an Indian battalion for 10 weeks in October, November and December.

Three companies from two Indian battalions for varying periods in January.

One Indian battalion from 13th January to the end of the period under review.

Nandgaon and Chhuikhadan.—One company of an Indian battalion for five weeks in November and December.

100 ranks, Indian Cavalry, from 7th January
One company of an Indian battalion from 6th February
} to the end of the period under review.

CHAPTER IV.

ORGANIZATION.

30. *Re-organization of Headquarters Formations.*—

With effect from the 1st November 1938, the Western Command (including the Baluchistan District) ceased to exist as such and the area hitherto occupied by that formation became the Western (Independent) District. No reduction was made in the number of brigades within the area but the Sind and Zhob Brigades relinquished their independent status. Coincidently with this reorganization a new brigade was formed at Thal in the Kohat District.

31. *Re-organization of units, etc.*—During the period under review certain re-organizations were carried out in connection with the policy of modernization. It will be seen that these adjustments involved certain reductions in the number of the units serving in India.

The main measures carried out are as follows :—

In addition to the two British Cavalry Regiments whose mechanisation was referred to in paragraph 16 of last year's Summary, a third British Cavalry Regiment commenced mechanisation at Secunderabad in October 1938.

The fourth British Cavalry Regiment is to be withdrawn from India and not replaced.

As regards Artillery units, three Field Regiments are now on a mechanised basis. One Field Regiment was withdrawn from the Indian establishment with

effect from the 31st March 1939 and one Horse Artillery Battery has been transferred to the Imperial Government.

Three companies of the Royal Tank Regiment in India were disbanded during the period under review.

Certain adjustments and reductions in Signal and Sapper and Miner units have been carried out.

No. 4 Section, Indian Army Veterinary Corps at Sialkot was disbanded with effect from the 15th May 1938 consequent on the conversion of two Indian Cavalry Regiments into Armoured Car Regiments.

On the re-organisation of Western Command, it has been found possible to dispense with four 3-ton Independent Mechanical Transport Sections (lower establishment). On the other hand certain workshop units have been formed for the maintenance of units recently mechanised.

32. *Indian units overseas.*—During the period under review, the situation as regards these remained unchanged. The question of withdrawing the Indian Infantry Battalion serving at Taiping in the Malay States has been reconsidered, and its retention there found desirable for the present. The 1/2nd Punjab Regiment have returned to India from there and have been replaced by the 2nd Battalion, 17th Dogra Regiment.

33. *Recruiting.*—Recruiting during the period under review has, on the whole, been satisfactory. There are no changes in the recruiting organization given in paragraph 20 of last year's report.

34. *Medal.*—His Majesty the King approved of a new medal being struck to commemorate military operations in or on the Frontier of India. The new medal is known as the " India General Service Medal, 1936 " and supersedes the " India General Service Medal 1908 ". This medal with clasp " North West Frontier 1936/37 " has been awarded to the forces which were employed in the operations in Waziristan 1936-37.

CHAPTER V.

FINANCE.

35. *Defence expenditure—India.*—

Estimates 1938-39.—The Budget Estimates for Defence Services which includes the Navy, Army and Air Forces for 1938-39 was fixed at 45·18 crores as against 44·62 crores in 1937-38. There was an increase, therefore, of 56 lakhs over the provision of the previous year, and this amount together with 27 lakhs being the first instalment of a contribution of His Majesty's Government towards the mechanisation of certain Cavalry and Infantry units in India, was made available for the purpose.

36. *Actual expenditure 1938-39.*—Actual expenditure for 1938-39 is 46·18 crores or an increase of 1 crore over the original appropriation. The principal reasons which led to this excess are firstly the necessity to apply to British soldiers on the Indian establishment improved conditions of service

sanctioned by His Majesty's Government estimated at 115 lakhs ; secondly, the continuance on a rather desultory scale of operations in Waziristan estimated to cost 45 lakhs, counterbalanced by savings which were partly due to the release of 4 British Battalions from the Indian establishment (16 lakhs), partly to economies effected in expenditure (14 lakhs) and to a certain extent due to restriction of expenditure on the mechanisation of certain units.

37. *Budget estimates 1939-40.*—The budget for 1939-40 has been fixed at Rs. 45·18 crores. The comparative figures of Defence expenditure since 1930 are as follows :—

Year.	Crores of Rs.
1930-31	.. 54·30
1931-32	.. 51·76
1932-33	.. 46·74
1933-34	.. 44·42
1934-35	.. 44·34
1935-36	.. 44·98
1936-37	.. 45·45
1937-38	.. 47·22
1938-39 (Budget)	.. 45·18 (Estimate).
1938-39 (Revised)	.. 46·18 (Estimate).

38. *Defence expenditure—Great Britain and Dominions.*—A brief review of Defence expenditure for 1938, of Great Britain and other dominions may be of interest.

Australia, with a total population of just under 7 millions maintains a fleet of the total tonnage of some sixty thousand tons, including four cruisers and five destroyers.

Its Air Force consists of seven squadrons of aircraft and is being considerably increased. The land forces consisting of 41,000, mostly volunteers, are being increased and re-equipped. Considerable expenditure on coast defence is also being incurred.

The Commonwealth Treasurer has forecast the expenditure for 1939 at £16¾ millions or over Rs. 30 per head.

Canada, with a population of about 10½ millions maintains naval forces on both the Pacific and Atlantic coasts which are being more than doubled in number, while coast defences, particularly on the Pacific coast, are being established. Its air force consists of 8 permanent and 7 semi-permanent squadrons. This too is being increased and with the existence of an aircraft industry in Canada forms a valuable nucleus for rapid expansion in War.

The expenditure budgeted for 1938-39 was over 34 million dollars or approximately £7,000,000 which represents an expenditure of roughly Rs. 8/8/- per head of the population.

New Zealand, with a population of 1½ millions maintains two cruisers and auxiliary craft.

The Air Force consists of over two squadrons.

The regular army comprises some 500 ranks while the territorial establishment is about 12,000.

The total expenditure for 1938-39 on Defence being £ 2 million roughly works out at Rs. 17/12/- per head of the population.

The Union of South Africa, though maintaining little or no naval craft, have recently decided to make their ports proof against attack by even the largest warships by installing coast defence guns at a cost of over a million pounds.

Their Air Forces which have hitherto been mainly on a training basis are under expansion, while their citizen army consists of some 1,000 permanent personnel, 9,000 citizen force, with a reserve of 1,26,000 trained men.

Their expenditure on Defence for 1938-39 is estimated at approximately 4½ million pounds, representing an expenditure of roughly Rs. 6 per head of the population.

Great Britain, it is estimated, with its 47 millions inhabitants, is to spend over 650 million pounds on Defence during the current year. This represents a cost of £14 or Rs. 180 per head of the population.

India, with its population of over 370 millions and 5,000 miles of coast line spends on Defence roughly Rs. 46 crores, which works out at Rs. 1/4/- per head of the population.

CHAPTER VI.

INDIANIZATION.

39. *Policy.*—

The accepted policy of Indianization of the Army remains the same. It is, briefly, to introduce Indianized units to the equivalent of one division, one cavalry brigade and ancillary troops. This decision embraces all arms and branches of the service.

40. *Progress.*—

The normal output of the Indian Military Academy remains approximately 56 cadets per annum. The following figures give the progress up to date :—

Number of Indian Commissioned Officers appointed to commissions	247
Number of Indian Commissioned Officers resigned, removed or deceased	5
Number of Indian Commissioned Officers now serving ..	242

Number of Indian Commissioned Officers who have already joined Indian Army units is made up as follows :—

Cavalry	13	
Infantry	146	
Indian Artillery	5	173
Corps of Indian Engineers	6	
Indian Signal Corps	3	

In addition there are 69 Indian Commissioned Officers attached to British units or undergoing post-graduate training.

41. *Indian Military Academy.*—

During the year, cadets were admitted to the Indian Military Academy as follows :—

August 1938	..	15	by competitive examination,
		15	from the Indian Army, and
		10	from Indian States for the Indian States Forces.
Total	..	40	
January 1939	..	15	by competitive examination,
		15	from the Indian Army, and
		9	from Indian States for the Indian States Forces.
Total	..	39	

In the passing out examination held in May 1938, of 27 cadets all were successful, and at the examination held in December, 1938, all 32 cadets were successful.

The number of candidates presenting themselves for examination dropped to 79 in October 1938 but rose again to 91 in the examination which was held in April 1939. With the exception of the entry for March/April 1935, this is the largest number that has appeared for a March examination for some years.

42. *Kitchener College.*—

Sixty Indian Army students are selected annually for admission to the Kitchener College, Nowgong, in July and December. Candidates successfully completing the eighteen months' course appear before a Selection Board and twenty-six are selected annually for admission to the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun. In addition four Indian Territorial Force and/or Auxiliary Force candidates are selected.

This system of selection, which has proved successful, has superseded the method of direct entry from units to the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun.

43. *Prince of Wales's Royal Indian Military College, Dehra Dun.*—

The College has now been recognized by the Cambridge Examinations Syndicate for the issue of the Cambridge School Certificate " A ". The effect of this is that a cadet who is unsuccessful in obtaining a competitive vacancy for the Indian Military Acamedy may, if he wishes, continue his studies at a university without passing matriculation and in some universities will be accepted in the second year class for the Intermediate examination.

The Punjab Government have agreed to provide five scholarships a year for Punjabi Cadets at the Prince of Wales's Royal Indian Military College, tenable for a period not exceeding eight years and five scholarships a year for Punjab Cadets who graduate from the Prince of Wales's Royal Indian Military College to the Indian Military Academy, tenable for a period of two and a half years.

The following new measures have been introduced in connection with Indianization of the Army :—

44. *Extra regimental employment.*—

British officers and King's Commissioned Indian Officers after serving for a number of years with their units, and having obtained certain qualifications, are eligible for extra regimental employment with such units as the Royal Indian Army Service Corps, Indian Army Ordnance Corps, Army Remount Department, Military Farms Department, Judge Advocate General's Department, Survey of India, etc.

Certain Indian Commissioned Officers are now within the service limitations, and extra regimental employment is now open to these officers subject to the same conditions as British officers and King's commissioned Indian Officers.

Specific units of these departments are not being Indianized, and Indianization will proceed by dispersion throughout the Corps and Departments.

45. *Revision of the financial indenture for students at the Indian Military Academy.*—

Originally if the cadet or his guarantors failed to comply with certain contingencies, or if the cadet left the academy of his own volition, or resigned his commission within the first five years of his service, the guarantors were liable to pay Government any sum, not exceeding Rs. 5,000 which Government may have expended on the training of the cadet.

It was considered that cadets who did not desire to remain at the academy should not be compelled to do so by threat of financial forfeit, and for this reason the indenture bond shown in Regulations respecting admission to the Indian Military Academy has been revised.

The revised financial indenture was published under Army Instruction India) No. 279 of 1938. Guarantors who signed the original certificate have accordingly been released from the liability referred to above.

46. *Appointment to commissions in the Indian Land Forces.—*

Prior to January 1939, Indian Commissioned Officers intended for such arms as Artillery, Engineers and Signals were seconded from and Indianized Cavalry or Infantry unit while undergoing attachment or post-graduate courses.

Indian commissioned officers are now granted commissions in His Majesty's Land Forces and appointed direct to their arms of the service to carry out training.

This action was taken in conjunction with the introduction of the Woolwich wing of the Indian Military Academy for the purpose of training cadets specifically for Artillery, Engineers and Signals.

47. *Indianization—Military Engineer Services.—*

A further measure of Indianization in the Military Engineer Services, comprising the following, has been sanctioned :—

(*i*) Increase of 1 Civilian Assistant Engineer in the Buildings and Roads Branch.

(*ii*) Introduction of a cadre of 2 Civilian Assistant Engineers in the Furniture and Stores Branch.

(*iii*) Increase of 7 Civilian Sub-Divisional Officers in the Buildings and Roads Branch.

(*iv*) Increase of 15 Civilian Sub-Divisional Officers in the Electrical and Mechanical Branch.

(*v*) Introduction of a cadre of 15 civilian sub-Divisional Officers in the Furniture and Stores Branch.

(*vi*) Increase of 6 Civilian Supervisors in the Furniture and Store Branch.

The revised establishments are being gradually completed by appointing civilians against vacancies released by casualties among departmental officers and military sub-divisional officers.

48. *Indian Army Veterinary Corps.—*

The position regarding Indianization remains the same as last year. The establishment for 1938-39 was sixteen. The actual strength of Indian Commissioned Officers was fifteen including one on probation.

There is at present a shortage of candidates which, however, appears likely to be rectified in the course of the next few years owing to the increased number of Indian gentlemen now studying for the diploma of Member of the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons.

49. *Appointment of Indianization Committee.—*

In accordance with the undertaking given by the Secretary, Defence Department, in the Legislative Assembly on the 2nd September 1938, the

Government of India have appointed a Committee with the following composition and terms of reference :—

(*a*) COMPOSITION.

Chairman.

Lieutenant-General, Sir R. C. WILSON, K.C.B., D.S.O., M.C., Adjutant General in India.

Members.

The Hon'ble Sir A. P. PATRO, K.C.I.E.

The Hon'ble Rai Bahadur L. RAMSARAN DAS, C.I.E.

The Hon'ble Mr. V. V. KALIKAR.

The Hon'ble Nawabzada KHURSHID ALI KHAN, M.B.E.

Captain Sardar Sir SHER MOHAMMAD KHAN, C.I.E., M.B.E., M.L.A.

Captain Sardar Bahadur DALPAT SINGH, O.B.I., I.O.M., M.L.A.

Lieutenant-Colonel M. A. RAHMAN, I.M.S., M.L.A.

Mr. P. R. DAMZEN, M.L.A.

Khan Bahadur Nawab MUZAFFAR KHAN, C.I.E.

Sir JOGENDRA SINGH.

Dr. B. S. MOONJE.

Mr. C. MacI. G. OGILVIE, C.B.E., I.C.S., M.L.A.

Colonel G. A. PIM.

Lieutenant-Colonel W. L. LLOYD, M.C.

Pandit H. N. KUNZRU.

Sir MOHAMMAD YAKUB.

Secretary.

Major D. R. E. R. BATEMAN.

(*b*) TERMS OF REFERENCE.

To examine the progress of Indianization of the officer ranks of the Indian Army with a view to determining whether the results achieved justify acceleration, and if it appears from this examination that they do not, to consider such alteration in the system of recruitment to the Indian Military Academy as may be expected to lead to an improvement in the number of suitable candidates and to make recommendations.

CHAPTER VII.

ROYAL INDIAN NAVY.

50. *Personnel.*—

The present strength of the Royal Indian Navy on the 1st April 1939 consisted of 186 officers, including those lent to the Commerce Department, and 1,153 ratings excluding boys under training.

In pursuance of the Expansion Programme of the Royal Indian Navy, the establishment was increased during 1938-39 by 12 officers and 205 ratings.

51. *Initial Training of Officers.*—

Full initial training of officers, amounting to 3 years and 9 months for Executive, and 4 years and 8 months for Engineer Officers, was introduced during 1938-39. Officers entering the Royal Indian Navy now do exactly the same training in England, as Cadet, Midshipman and Sub-Lieutenant as a cadet entering the Royal Navy from a British public school.

52. *Introduction of Commissioned Warrant Rank.*—

A scheme providing for promotion of Warrant Officers to Commissioned Warrant rank, on the lines of that in force in the Royal Navy, was introduced during 1938-39.

53. *Introduction of Revised Rates of Pay for Indian Warrant Officers.*—

An improvement in the pay of Indian Warrant Officers has remedied an unsatisfactory situation which had existed since the revision of pay of Commissioned and British Warrant Officers.

54. *Boys' Training Establishment.*—

In September 1938 the Government of India sanctioned the separation from the Depot of the Boys' Training Establishment, which became an independent command. This Establishment continues for the present to be located in Bombay but will shortly be transferred to Manora (Karachi) when the new buildings now under construction there are completed.

55. *Indian Officers.*—

Two open examinations were held in October 1938 and March 1939, and a special examination for "DUFFERIN" cadets in October 1938. As a result of the "DUFFERIN" examination, 3 cadets were entered for the Executive branch and one for Engineering. No candidates obtained qualifying marks at the open examinations.

On 1st April 1939, there were 9 Indian officers in the Executive and 9 in the Engineering branch of the Royal Indian Navy, and 14 Indian Midshipmen and Cadets were under instruction in England.

56. *Indian Naval Reserve Forces.*—

Sanction has been given for the formation of the Royal Indian Fleet Reserve and Royal Indian Naval Volunteer Reserve. The object of the Fleet Reserve is to retain the services of trained ratings of the Royal Indian Navy after they have ceased to be actively employed.

Recruitment has begun for the Royal Indian Naval Volunteer Reserve, which consists of officers only. These officers need not necessarily have had previous sea experience, but are instructed in naval duties during periodical

training and will be available to meet increased requirements of officers in war. British and Indian Officers are recruited in equal proportions, and a satisfactory number of candidates have come forward.

It is hoped shortly to start recruiting for the Royal Indian Naval Reserve, which will consist of officers and men of the Mercantile Marine.

57. *Vessels and their equipment.*—

No change has occurred during the past year in the vesse'ls composing the Royal Indian Navy.

It is hoped that some provision will be made in the near future for the replacement of obsolete ships and equipment.

58. *Naval Wireless Telegraphy Station.*—

The construction of the new Royal Indian Navy Wireless Telegraphy Station at Bombay, which was started in November 1937, was completed in January 1939.

59. *Cruises during the year.*—

H. M. I. S. "CLIVE" visited Karwar in April 1938, and carried out Minesweeping and other exercises.

In June 1938 H. M. I. S. "CLIVE", "HINDUSTAN", "INDUS" and "LAWRENCE" visited Karachi for a training cruise.

The Flag Officer Commanding in "CLIVE", with "HINDUSTAN" "INDUS" and "LAWRENCE" in company, proceeded on a cruise to Persian Gulf ports in July and August, returning to Karachi on completion. The ships returned from Karachi to Bombay in September.

H. M. I. S. "LAWRENCE" visited Kathiawar ports and Karachi in October and November 1938.

In November H. M. I. S. "HINDUSTAN" visited Karachi and Khor Kuwai, taking part in exercises with the Persian Gulf Division of the Royal Navy. "INDUS" visited West coast ports with His Excellency the Governor of Bombay and Lady Lumley, who made a public landing at Marmagoa.

Starting in December H. M. I. S. "INDUS" carried out an extensive cruise, visiting Ceylon, East coast ports, Burma, Mergui Archipelago and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The Flag Officer Commanding embarked at Calcutta, visiting Rangoon and the Andamans and disembarking at Madras. A detachment was landed to take part in the Proclamation Day Parade at Calcutta.

H. M. I. S. "CORNWALLIS" visited West coast ports in November and December. In January 1939 "HINDUSTAN" and "CORNWALLIS" visited Aden and took part in the Centenary celebrations. His Highness the Sultan of Makalla took passage to Aden in "HINDUSTAN".

On the 26th January, H. E. the Viceroy and H. E. the Governor of Bombay embarked in "CLIVE" and witnessed a gunnery practice off Bombay.

H. M. I. S. "LAWRENCE" carried out a cruise in the West coast of India in February.

H. M. I. S. "CLIVE" visited Karachi in February, and at the beginning of March left Bombay for a cruise to Ceylon, Madras, Calcutta, Andaman Islands and Rangoon.

The distances steamed by H. M. I. Ships during the year 1938-39 were as follows :—

	Miles.
"CLIVE"	8,430
"HINDUSTAN"	11,276
"INDUS"	16,130
"LAWRENCE"	7,524
"CORNWALLIS"	6,102
"INVESTIGATOR"	12,823
"PATHAN"	2,824

CHAPTER VIII.

Air Forces.

60. *Organization.*

The Air Forces in India consist of a Command Headquarters at Simla/ Delhi, a Group Headquarters at Peshawar, 4 Stations at Risalpur, Kohat, Ambala, and Lahore and an Aircraft Depot at Karachi.

A re-organisation programme to meet modernization needs was drawn up in 1938. In consequence of this programme No. 31 Squadron moved from Karachi to Lahore in October 1938, No. 60 Squadron from Kohat to Ambala and No. 28 Squadron from Ambala to Kohat in February 1939.

61. *Strength—Personnel.*

British personnel consists of 249 officers and 1930 airmen ; Indian personnel 16 officers and 662 airmen. Four Indian officers have been seconded from the Indian Army and 3 are now undergoing training in Egypt and 1 at Karachi. There are also 3 Indian cadets receiving their training in England.

The strength and composition of the Indian Air Force is given as Appendix I (page 33).

62. *Operational and Training Flights.*

Extensive operational flying has been undertaken in Waziristan during the period.

The following special flights were carried out during the period under review :—

(*a*) On April 10th, four aircraft of No. 60 Squadron flew to Gilgit. Subsequently throughout the year other flights were made over this route.

(*b*) In April, 12 Harts of No. 11 Squadron made a flight from Risalpur to Heliopolis in Egypt and returned. The flight gave valuable experience in long distance moves.

(*c*) An Air Force officer was attached to the Air Party of the German Nanga Parbat expedition, and accompanied them during the flights between Srinagar and the camps by which method supply and communication with the climbing party was maintained.

(*d*) In October, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield and members of his Committee were flown over Waziristan.

(*e*) In November, the Under Secretary of State for India was flown from Lahore to Sialkot and back to Lahore. In January 1939 he was flown from Delhi to Rangoon.

63. *Indian Air Force and Waziristan Operations.*

The Indian Air Force has been actively engaged on operational flying over Waziristan for a total of two months during the period. Although the squadron as a whole remained in Ambala, flights were detached at Miranshah for this purpose from time to time.

64. *Re-equipment.*

In September 1938 Airspeed Envoy aircraft for the Communication Flight were flown from Portsmouth to Lahore. The Air Officer Commanding, Air Forces in India personally piloted one aircraft.

A Blenheim aircraft was provided in March 1939 for re-equipment training of No. 60 Squadron.

New types of aircraft are being supplied as re-equipment of certain squadrons in India.

CHAPTER IX.

Supply and Quartering.

Principal Supply Officers' Committee (India).

65. *Functions.*

The Principal Supply Officers' Committee (India) is an inter-departmental Committee of the Government of India on which all the consuming Departments of Government and Branches of Army Headquarters are represented. It coordinates the measures necessary to ensure supply of requirements in war for the Defence Services, for essential civilian services, for essential industries and for the civil population. It works in the closest liaison with similar organisations in the United Kingdom and Dominions with a view to ensuring a mutually beneficial exchange of those commodities of which a deficiency may

be expected in different parts of the Empire. Some of the problems with which it deals are outlined below.

66. *Importance of Industry.*

Under modern conditions the maintenance of Defence Forces in the areas of active operation has ceased to depend solely on the resources of the establishments and factories maintained by the Defence Department. Ever increasing reliance has to be placed on the assistance of civilian industry and it is also essential to keep all the normal means of communication in a state of efficiency-railways, river, road and air transport, postal, telegraph, telephone and broadcasting services.

67. *Imports and Shipping.*

Shipping space is likely to be restricted in times of emergency and with the advent of submarines and aircraft of increased radius of action, the security of the maritime routes is likely to be affected. Any steps which can be taken in peace to render any country less dependent on imports in war will have a direct bearing on its capacity to maintain forces in areas of operation.

There are many materials which it is not economically possible to produce in peace but for the supply of which arrangements should be made in peace.

Nearly every industry in India is dependent on the import of certain essential necessaries. There is little value from a supply point of view in establishing assembly plants which are dependent entirely on the import of the components. Such plants provide wages and work but do not increase security of supply.

68. *Skilled Labour and Machinery.*

Manufacturing capacity is dependent on the existence of a sufficient labour supply and the utilization of the bulk of this supply is dependent on the existence of sufficient truly skilled labour to supervise the semi-skilled labour and for the setting up and maintenance of the machinery and tools to be used by semi-skilled labour.

69. *Indigenous Supply.*

As a result of endeavours by the Central Purchase Oreganisation of the Defence Services, manufacture of the under-noted stores has been developed in India :—

Rubber components of respirators, anti-gas.

Fire extinguishers, Soda Acid type.

Canvas shoes.

The importance of developing indigenous supplies not only of manufactured articles but of raw materials, whenever possible, is fully recognized.

70. *Articles of Military Supply.*

This has been generally satisfactory. The following information, however, may be of interest.

Ghee. – Supplies of ghee, in which interest has been evinced, continue to be eminently satisfactory both from the point of view of quality and price

Rice.—Burma has been the chief source of supply of rice. Satisfactory sources of supply of Indian rice have now been established.

71. *Remounts.*

A scheme for the registration of camels in peace by the Army Remount Department was introduced in 1936. As the objects of the scheme no longer apply it has been decided to abolish camel registration, in peace, with effect from 1st April 1939.

It has been decided to abolish the horse stallion breeding stud at Ahmednagar in 1939/40.

72. *Military Farms Department.*

Consequent upon reduced requirements of fodder, certain grass farms have been closed down and a number of others have been amalgamated with dairy farms.

73. *Accommodation.*

(a) *Officers.*—Owing to an increasing influx of civilians into cantonments, rents of bungalows are steadily rising and suitable accommodation for military officers is becoming more expensive and difficult to secure. A few bungalows are provided each year by purchase, acquisition or construction in cantonments where the situation is found to be most acute, but the general situation is far from satisfactory, and the only remedy would be to undertake a large programme of acquisition and construction. This, however, is not possible at present owing to the paucity of funds.

(b) *British Troops and Indian Troops.*—A new set of lines for an Indian Armoured Regiment (less one squadron and a troop) is at present under construction at Dera Ismail Khan, and is expected to be completed during 1939-40.

Indian Troops lines and British Troops barracks are being brought up to date on an annual programme as far as funds permit.

74. *Quetta Reconstruction.*

Work has been completed on the 1st and 2nd instalments of the rebuilding programme.

Contracts for two more groups for Indian Infantry lines and Indian personnel quarters of certain units and departments of the Defence Services were accepted in March 1939.

CHAPTER X.

ORDNANCE.

75. *Provision and repair of vehicles.*

The responsibility for the provision, repair and maintenance of all mechanically propelled vehicles was transferred from the Quartermaster General to the Master General of the Ordnance on the 1st April 1939. The resources of workshop

facilities of both the branches have been pooled with the object of economising buildings, plant and personnel. Consequently the personnel previously serving with the Mechanical Transport Technical Branch of the Royal Indian Army Service Corps have been transferred to the Indian Army Ordnance Corps.

76. *Provision of vehicles.*

Vehicles used in the Army are classified as under :—

(*i*) Specialised vehicles, *e.g.*, light tanks, armoured cars, dragons, carriers and tractors ; vehicles with special technical bodies, such as workshop store, breakdown, wireless, cable laying, petrol tank, water tank lorries and motor cycles.

(*ii*) Vehicles in commercial use, *e.g.*, cars, trucks, lorries and ambulances.

The vehicles shown in category (*i*) which are not obtainable in India are ordered through the Director General, India Stores Department, London and are of British manufacture.

The vehicles in category (*ii*) are of Canadian and American manufacture, assembled in India, and are ordered through the Chief Controller of Stores, Indian Stores Department.

Chassis required for the carriage of special technical equipment, such as wireless, petrol tanks, water tanks and cable laying apparatus are now being ordered through the Chief Controller of Stores, Indian Stores Department and will in future be category (*ii*) vehicles.

77. *Repair of Vehicles.*

Repair work will be carried out by the following organisations :—

1st Line Repair Organisation.

Indian Army Ordnance Corps artificers have been permanently attached to mechanised units, to assist unit tradesmen in the maintenance of their vehicles. This attached personnel is termed a "Light Aid Detachment". It is under the control of the Unit Commander and assists in the 1st line repairs of unit vehicles and the recovery of damaged vehicles, and forms a link between the mechanized unit and the 2nd line repair organisation. It is anticipated that this arrangement will lead to a high standard of unit maintenance.

2nd Line Repair Organisation.

The 2nd line repair organisation deals with the repairs to vehicles, armaments and ordnance stores, fitting overhauled engines, gearboxes and axle assemblies and generally carrying out any repairs that are beyond the scope of the 1st line organisation. These repairs are carried out in Indian Army Ordnance Corps Workshop Companies and Sections.

3rd Line Repair Organisation.

The 3rd line repair organisation deals with major repairs of vehicles, equipment, spare parts, armaments and ordnance stores that are beyond the capacity of the 2nd line workshops.

The Heavy Repair Shops that existed under the Royal Indian Army Service Corps, have been taken over by the Indian Army Ordnance Corps and are now Ordnance Depots of the Corps for 3rd line repairs.

A new feature of the repair organisation has been the introduction of "Motor Mechanics" and "Driver Mechanics" in units. These grades are found from "unit" personnel. This personnel together with the Light Aid Detachment carry out the 1st line maintenance and repair within the unit.

78. *Technical training of skilled personnel.*

The Indian Army Ordnance Corps School of Instruction (now known as the Indian Army Ordnance Corps Training Centre) formerly at Kirkee has been transferred to Jubbulpore and will be expanded by October to cope with the training of 400 fitters and 100 electricians per annum. The average period of training will be approximately 12 months. At the present stage only recruits who have reached a certain degree of proficiency in their trade are being entertained. Later untrained personnel will be enrolled for training as artificers.

The training of Indian armourers is being transferred from Ishapore to Jubbulpore and the numbers under training will be increased from 30 to 96 at the close of the year.

79. *Factories.*

V. B. Tripods.—Arrangements have been made for the manufacture of tripod mountings for Vickers-Berthier gun at the Gun and Shell Factory, Cossipore.

Web equipment.—The question of undertaking the manufacture of the 1937 pattern of web equipment in Ordnance Factories from webbing obtained from the trade in India is being investigated. Manufacture will only be undertaken from imported webbing if it is found impracticable to obtain webbing from Indian sources.

Pyrotechnics for Air Forces in India.—Trial orders for the manufacture of certain pyrotechnic stores required by the Air Forces in India have been placed with the Ammunition Factory, Kirkee, in order to explore the possibility of establishing their manufacture in this country.

CHAPTER XI.

Health, Medical and Veterinary Service.

80. *General Health.*

This has been satisfactory both for British and Indian troops throughout the year, although military cantonments have at times been exposed to severe epidemics raging in their vicinity.

A brief review of the more prevalent major diseases is as follows :—

(*i*) *Cholera*, spreading from a well-known fair affected the greater part of Northern India. With the exception of one isolated outbreak amongst troops on a journey, the disease caused no harm to military personnel.

(*ii*) *Plague*, endemic and epidemic round certain Southern cantonments was likewise prevented.

(*iii*) *Malaria*, the biggest single source of sickness for military personnel and constantly present amongst the civil population, has been effectively dealt with during the year by active anti-malarial measures in cantonments and the increasingly satisfactory results of our present methods of treatment.

The year has been officially one of peace on the frontier and therefore health and sickness return from Waziristan have been included once more with those for all India, although field activities affecting the health of troops were actually in progress.

81. *Sick and death rates.*

(All ratios per 1000). The downward trend of sickness since the Great War period is shown by the following :—

Quinquennial periods.	Admissions.			Deaths.			Invalids.		
	B.Os.	B.O.Rs.	I.O.Rs.	B.Os.	B.O.Rs.	I.O.Rs.	B.Os.	B.O.Rs.	I.O.Rs.
1920-24 ..	676·7	791·9	593·2	6·71	5·24	8·01	20·99	18·91	18·25
1925-29 ..	589·9	619·4	385·6	5·25	2·90	3·48	17·44	13·50	10·80
1930-34 ..	423·6	604·7	453·3	6·69	2·64	2·63	20·09	8·88	6·55
1935-38 (4 years.) ..	337·8	580·2	415·7	5·49	2·44	2·07	20·28	9·55	5·52

Admission rates for British Other Ranks have been coming down steadily and are beginning to become constant at near the pre-war figure ; but even these rates are double the home sick rates. The rate for officers is definitely reduced ; that for I. O. Rs. shows some improvement. Death and invaliding rates are still on the downward trend.

82. (*a*) *The insect borne group of diseases.*

This group which includes malaria, sandfly fever and dengue, is the principal cause of admission, with malaria as the chief single disease, for British and Indian troops. The rates are :—

	Malaria.	Sandfly fever.	Dengue.
British	50·4	24·8	3·9 per 1000
Indian	109·6	4·6	1·1 per 1000

These are preventable diseases and considerable success can be claimed by present methods of prevention.

83. *Preventive Measures.*

Spraying.—Increasing attention is being devoted to this method which has the advantage of dealing with mosquitoes, sandflies, flies and other biting insects in the actual living quarters of all personnel. Dilute solutions of liquid pyrethrum extracts are being employed. Results in some stations have been most gratifying.

Malariol ; a ready mixed oily compound has been extensively tried out throughout the country during the year and reports indicate its superiority in action compared with the previous mixtures of crude oil with kerosine. The decision as to its use will depend on the relative costs.

Anti-mosquito cream and containers.—Issues of cream which proved successful in Waziristan 1937 have been authorised, on an as required basis, and aluminium containers for this cream sanctioned on a 25 per cent. basis for personnel in peace.

84. *The dysentery—diarrhoea group.*

This still remains a major cause of inefficiency, equalling the insect borne group. The group depends mainly for its transmission on flies combined with bad sanitation and the presence of carriers.

Prevention by protection of food and fly proofing of all cookhouses, dining rooms and quarters is thus our main defence, and it appears as though on this measure alone can any improvement be hoped for.

85. *Respiratory diseases.*

Have remained satisfactory and only a mild epidemic of influenza became evident towards the end of the year in the Punjab.

86. *The minor septic and local injuries.*—This gives a combined admission rate of about 121·9 for British and 92·1 for Indian troops. This indicates a considerable loss of its " man-days."

87. *Other Measures for Health and Comfort.*

Air Cooling of Hospitals.—The method of air cooling with combined propulsion and extraction through water cooled screens continues to receive attention and successful progress towards standardisation has been made.

Training and Sanitation.—This has received particular attention in all Commands as forming the bed rock of sanitary control in the field. All Commands have in use special directive pamphlets on sanitary control in cantonments.

A combined pamphlet on " First aid, Sanitation and water duties " has been now compiled and issued to all stations as a guide in training of troops.

Anti-Tetanus Toxoid immunisation.—This measure was introduced during the year in the United Kingdom and British troops arriving towards December had received this protection.

Steps are now being taken to endeavour to protect the whole of the army in India by this method.

88. *Veterinary Services.*

The following is a brief report of the more important contagious diseases which occurred during the year under review :—

Encephalomyolitis.—An outbreak of this disease, of which paralysis of varying degree constitutes the predominant symptom, was first recorded in 1933 when 71 cases occurred of which 24 proved fatal.

45 cases were reported during 1938-39 of which 7 died, 13 were destroyed, 20 were cured and 5 were remaining at the end of the year. Several destructions were ordered on account of the advanced age of the patient. Most of the cases occurred among horses in Quetta. The method of spread is at present doubtful and field experiments to transmit the disease from an affected to a healthy horse have failed.

Foot and Mouth Disease.—In view of the extent to which civilian cattle are affected and the many ways in which the disease can be spread, it is not suprising that some 2,000 cattle, chiefly of the Military Farms Department, were attacked. There were only 5 deaths.

Influenza.—57 camels were attacked in one out-break but every case was cured. Neosalvarsan proved particularly effective in preventing complications.

Nearly 2,000 cases of epidemic coughing, a mild form of influenza, occurred, the victims in nearly every case being horses. In two instances only was this disease fatal owing to pulmonary complications.

Rinderpest.—The policy of inoculation of cattle of the Military Farms Department has again proved highly successful and there was no case of this virulent disesase among protected stock during the year.

Outbreaks which occurred among unprotected slaughter cattle and cattle of the Military Farms Department which had escaped inoculation owing to immature age, recent purchase and other reasons served to emphasize the value of the methods of immunization now employed.

Trypanosomiasis (Surra).—The ravages of this fly-transmitted wasting disease on camels can best be demonstrated by statistics which show that between the years 1922/23 and 1927/28 the average annual deaths amounted to 313.

Since then the Mercuric chloride test for the scourge in its latent form has been introduced and immediate treatment by intravenous injection of naganol has enabled a strict control to be kept on the disease.

Of 560 camels found to be affected with Surra during the year only 1 succumbed to its effects. The great majority of cases occurred on the frontier but in a very short time the patient was returned to duty, cured.

89. *Military Veterinary Laboratory.*—This Institution continues to do excellent work. In addition to investigating major outbreaks of contagious disease as they occurred among army animals it has played an important part in the investigation of sterility and strangles in co-operation with the Imperial Veterinary Research Institute, Mukteswar.

CHAPTER XII.

Indian Soldiers' Board and Welfare Work.

90. *Object of Indian Soldiers' Board.*

The Indian Soldiers' Board, together with its organization of Provincial, State and District Soldiers' Boards, exists to safeguard the interests of the

Indian ex-soldier and his family, to look after their needs and to assist as far as they can from the funds at their disposal those of them who are in distressed circumstances.

Details of the funds controlled by the Indian Soldiers' Board are to be found in the Board's Annual Report, copies of which are in the Library of the Assembly.

91. *Maintenance Grant for Soldiers' Board Organizations.*

During the financial year 1938-39 the Indian Soldiers' Board made a grant of about Rs. 55,000 from the Indian Soldiers' Board Fund to the various Provincial, State and District Soldiers' Boards subordinate to them. District Soldiers' Boards spent this money in the maintenance of their organizations and in looking after all matters affecting the home interests of ex-soldiers and their families. These include, the initial examination of pension and medal claims, applications for the grant of scholarships, the distribution of medals, the investigation of cases of relief from charitable funds, the explanation of what educational concessions are available for ex-soldiers and the promotion of vocational training and rural re-construction schemes. Besides the sum mentioned above, these Boards also obtain assistance from the Indian Red Cross Society's Funds for ex-soldiers invalided out of the Indian Army for chronic diseases. In most cases the President of a District Soldiers' Board is the Deputy Commissioner or District Magistrate, and its Vice-President a Military officer provided usually from an Indian Infantry Training Battalion or Territorial Battalion. Its Secretary, either paid or unpaid, is normally a retired Viceroy's commissioned officer. Funds are available for military vice-presidents, secretaries and members of Boards to tour their districts on Solidiers' Board business.

92. *Grants of Relief.*

One of the most important functions of the Indian Soldiers' Board is to afford relief from the funds at their disposal to Indian ex-soldiers or their dependants who are in distressed circumstances. During the year 1938-39 the Board sanctioned grants totalling over Rs. 72,000 in 1269 cases from the Indian Army Benevolent Fund, and Rs. 23,000 to 289 applicants from the India and Burma Military and Marine Relief Fund. Grants totalling over Rs. 1,800 were also made in 14 cases from the Sir Victor Sassoon Fund.

The Board also pays a special pension of Rs. 5 a month in addition to their service pensions to Indian soldiers who lost their sight while on active service during the war. Funds for this purpose come from the balance of the St. Dustan's Fund which was raised during the war and handed over to the Board after its close.

93. *Employment for ex-soldiers.*

Between the years 1922 and 1938 employment was found under Government alone for over 81,000 ex-soldiers. During the year 1938-39 employment was found for over 4,000 ex-soldiers in official and non-official appointments. Various District Soldiers' Boards and Recruiting Officers maintain lists of reliable ex-soldiers desirous of employment in their own districts.

94. *Rural Reconstruction (ex-soldiers).*

During the year 1936-37 the Board decided to allot a sum of Rs. 10,000 a year for three years for promoting schemes of rural reconstruction in selected villages. The intention is that the inhabitants of a selected village shall decide upon a scheme of benefit to them, and provided they agree to meet half its cost either in money, kind or labour, the remaining half of the cost will be met from the Board's grant. Examples of the types of schemes which are now being worked out in districts of the Punjab are the provision of wireless sets, primary schools, wells, canals, irrigation and street paving, the training and maintenance of *dais* and improvements in village-hygiene.

95. *Vocational Training.*

The Board has made a number of efforts to promote vocational training for ex-soldiers after their discharge. Up to now they have not met with much success as ex-soldiers on the whole seem reluctant to undergo such courses even when the costs of training and of railway expenses to and from their homes to the place of instruction are met by the Indian Soldiers Board. Further efforts are now being made to discover alternative methods of vocational and agricultural training in the Punjab and the United Provinces.

96. *General.*

On the whole the year 1938-39 was a successful one. This was due largely to the increased efficiency in District Soldiers' Board work brought about by the reorganization of District Soldiers' Boards in 1936. The reorganization took the form of a change in the personnel of military vice-presidents (making one unit responsible for not more than two or three Boards instead of as in the past one Recruiting Officer being responsible for most of the Boards in his recruiting area), secretaries being appointed to Boards where none existed before, improved office staff and accommodation and the allotment of funds for military vice-presidents, secretaries and members of District Soldiers' Boards to tour their districts on District Soldiers' Boards business. A number of Boards, particularly in the United Provinces and Bombay, and also the Punjab, which had been inactive for some time have improved beyond recognition. Local tehsil or taluqa sub-committees of the Boards have been started or reconstituted in many districts. The Civil and Military Station District Soldiers' Board at Bangalore was abolished and a Board was reconstituted at that place by the name of the Madras Soldiers' Board which is responsible for looking after the interests of the ex-service population in the southern part of the Madras Presidency. Three new District Soldiers' Boards were also formed, two in the United Provinces (Bara Banki and Jhansi) and one in the Hyderabad State with its headquarters at Secunderabad.

97. *Child Welfare Centres.*—These continue to increase and to improve both for British and particularly for Indian troops. There is no doubt that they are beginning to play an important part in the family life of the Indian soldier in cantonments.

APPENDIX I. (See Chapter VIII, paragraph 61.)

INDIAN AIR FORCE.

Strength on 25th July 1939.

1. *Station.*—AMBALA—Strength 2 flights.

2. *Officers*—

Flight Lieutenants	..	2
Flying officers	..	12
Pilot officers	..	2
Total	..	16

There are also 3 cadets under training at Cranwell.

3. *Other ranks.*

Group I.—Technical (Mechanics)	..	63
Group II.—Technical (Specialists)	..	43
Group III.—Clerical	..	5
Group IV.—Semi-Skilled	..	33
Air ratings	Total ..	144
M. T. Drivers	..	8
Total	..	152

M71DD—650—22-8-39—GIPS

W 253-40-2.

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The Residency,

Bangalore.

9th January 1940.

Publication entitled "HOW HITLER MADE THE WAR".

Forwarded with the compliments of the Secretary to the Hon'ble the Resident in Mysore.



The Chief Secretary to the Government of His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore, Bangalore.

HOW HITLER MADE THE WAR

The inner story as told in the Foreign Office telegrams and documents abridged from the Blue Book and from Sir Nevile Henderson's Final Report.

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HOW HITLER MADE THE WAR

GERMANY'S PACT WITH POLAND.

On January 26, 1934, the Governments of Germany and Poland concluded a 10-year agreement.

> "The German Government and the Polish Government," it declared, "consider that the time has come to introduce a new phase in the political relations between Germany and Poland by a direct understanding between State and State.....
>
> The two Governments base their action on the fact that the maintenance and guarantee of a lasting peace between their countries is an essential pre-condition for the general peace of Europe.
>
> They have therefore decided to base their mutual relations on the principles laid down in the Pact of Paris of the 27th August, 1928" [*i.e.*, the Briand-Kellogg Pact for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy]...
>
> "Both Governments announce their intention to settle directly all questions of whatever sort which concern their mutual relations.
>
> Should any disputes arise between them and agreement thereon not be reached by direct negotiation, they will in each particular case, on the basis of mutual agreement, seek a solution by other peaceful means. . . . *In no circumstances, however, will they proceed to the application of force for the purpose of reaching a decision in such disputes.*"

HITLER REAFFIRMS HIS FRIENDSHIP WITH POLAND

This declaration was to remain in force for a period of ten years, and Hitler repeatedly reaffirmed the friendly attitude of his Government towards Poland. Thus in his Reichstag speech of March 7, 1936 he said:

> "I would like the German people to learn to see in other nations historical realities which a visionary may well like to wish away, but which cannot be wished away. . .I would therefore like the German people to understand the inner motives of National Socialist foreign policy, which finds it painful that the outlet to the sea of a people of 35 millions is situated on territory formerly belonging to the Reich, but which recognises that it is unreasonable and impossible to deny a State of such a size as this any outlet to the sea at all. . ."

Again, in his Reichstag speech of February 20, 1938, Hitler said of the problem of Danzig that :

> " since the League of Nations finally gave up its perpetual attempts to unsettle Danzig and appointed in the new commissioner a man of great personal attainments, this most dangerous spot from the point of view of European peace has entirely lost its menacing character. The Polish State respects the national conditions in this State, and both the City of Danzig and Germany respect Polish rights. And so the way to a friendly understanding has been successfully paved, an understanding which, starting from Danzig, has to-day succeeded in spite of the attempts of certain mischief-makers in finally taking the poison out of the relations between Germany and Poland and transforming them into a sincere friendly co-operation."

As late as September 26, 1938, in the speech at the Berlin Sportpalast in which he renounced all further territorial ambitions in Europe, Hitler said :

> " We are all convinced that this agreement will bring lasting pacification. We realise that here are two peoples which must live together and neither of which can do away with the other. A people of 33 millions will always strive for an outlet to the sea. A way for understanding, then, had to be found ; it has been found ; and it will be ever further extended
>
> It was a real work of peace, of more worth than all the chattering in the League of Nations Palace at Geneva."

THE MARCH CRISIS

THE NAZIS OCCUPY PRAGUE *(March 15, 1939)*

On March 15, 1939, a new situation was created in Europe by the German annexation of Bohemia-Moravia, the country of the Czechs. " Public opinion in the world," said Mr. Chamberlain in his speech at Birmingham on March 17, " has received a sharper shock than has ever yet been administered to it, even by the present regime in Germany." Mr. Chamberlain went on to repeat the story of his meeting with Hitler the previous September at Godesberg, when the German Chancellor

> " speaking with great earnestness, repeated what he had already said at Berchtesgaden—namely, that this " [the Sudetenland] " was the last of his territorial ambitions in Europe, and that he had no wish to include in the Reich people of other races than German. Herr Hitler himself confirmed this account of the conversation in the speech which he made at the Sportpalast in Berlin,.....and

he added : ' I shall not be interested in the Czech State any more, and I can guarantee it. We don't want any Czechs any more.' "

" Well, in view of those repeated assurances given voluntarily to me, " continued the Prime Minister, " I considered myself justified in founding a hope upon them that once this Czecho-Slovakian question was settled, as it seemed at Munich it would be, it would be possible to carry farther that policy of appeasement which I have described. But, notwithstanding, at the same time I was not prepared to relax precautions until I was satisfied that the policy had been established and had been accepted by others, and therefore, after Munich, our defence programme was actually accelerated . . .

How can these events this week be reconciled with those assurances which I have read out to you ? .....What has become of this declaration of ' No further territorial ambition ' ? What has become of the assurance ' We don't want Czechs in the Reich ' ? What regard had been paid here to that principle of self-determination on which Herr Hitler argued so vehemently with me at Berchtesgaden when he was asking for the severance of Sudetenland from Czecho-Slovakia and its inclusion in the German Reich ? .....

Does not the question inevitably arise in our minds, if it is so easy to discover good reasons for ignoring assurances so solemnly and so repeatedly given, what reliance can be placed upon any other assurances that come from the same source ?

There is another set of questions which almost inevitably must occur in our minds and to the minds of others, perhaps even in Germany herself. Germany, under her present regime, has sprung a series of unpleasant surprises upon the world. The Rhineland, the Austrian *Anschluss*, the severance of Sudetenland—all these things shocked and affronted public opinion throughout the world. Yet, however much we might take exception to the methods which were adopted in each of those cases, there was something to be said, whether on account of racial affinity or of just claims too long resisted—there was something to be said for the necessity of a change in the existing situation.

But the events which have taken place this week in complete disregard of the principles laid down by the German Government itself seem to fall into a different category, and they must cause us all to be asking ourselves : ' Is this the end of an old adventure, or is it the beginning of a new ?

Is this the last attack upon a small State, or is it to be followed by others? Is this, in fact, a step in the direction of an attempt to dominate the world by force?'"

The same point was developed by Viscount Halifax in a speech to the House of Lords on March 20. "For years past," he said,

"the British people have steadily desired to be on friendly terms with the German people. There is no stronger national instinct among our people than the instinct that leads them, when they have a fight, to shake hands and try to make it up. Our people were not backward in recognising some of the mistakes of the Versailles Treaty that required remedying, but each time during these last years that there has seemed a chance of making progress in understanding, the German Government has taken action which has made that progress impossible. More especially has that been the case in recent months. Very shortly after Munich certain measures were taken by the German Government that gave a profound shock to world opinion. Quite recently it was to be hoped, although there were many clouds still over and below the horizon, that we could look forward to closer economic collaboration.....All that initiative has been frustrated by the action of the German Government last week, and it is difficult to see when it can be easily resumed."

HITLER'S NEW PROPOSALS TO POLAND (*March 21*)

Within a week of the occupation of Prague, the German Government gave a clear indication of their future intentions. On March 21, they presented a number of new proposals to the Polish Government.

These proposals required that Danzig should return "as a Free State into the framework of the German Reich," and that Germany should receive a route and railway with extra-territorial status through the Corridor. In exchange, Hitler offered Poland a 25-year Non-Aggression Pact and a pledge that Germany would regard the existing boundaries between Germany and Poland as "ultimate."

The Polish answer to these proposals was handed to the German Government on March 26.

"(*a*) The Polish Government propose a joint guarantee by Poland and Germany of the separate character of the Free City of Danzig, the existence of which was to be based on complete freedom of the local population in internal affairs and on the assurance of respect for Polish rights and interests.

The Polish Government were prepared to examine together with the German Government any further simplifications for persons in transit as well as ..... railway and motor transit between the German Reich and East Prussia.....

In formulating the above proposals the Polish Government acted in the spirit of the Polish-German Declaration of 1934 which by providing the direct exchanges of views on questions of interest to both countries, authorised each State to formulate its point of view in the course of negotiations."

THE ANGLO-POLISH DECLARATION OF MUTUAL SUPPORT (*April 6,*

Meanwhile the German occupation of Prague and the German attitude to Poland had convinced the British Government of the necessity of consulting with Poland and other States threatened by Nazi aggression with a view to providing for mutual security.

" In order to make perfectly clear the position of His Majesty's Government in the meantime before those consultations are concluded," said Mr. Chamberlain in the House of Commons on March 31, " I now have to inform the House that during that period, in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. They have given the Polish Government an assurance to this effect.

I may add that the French Government have authorised me to make it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as do His Majesty's Government."

On April 6, an Anglo-Polish communiqué announced that the two countries would :—

" enter into an agreement of a permanent and reciprocal character to replace the present temporary and unilateral assurance given by His Majesty's Government to the Polish Government. Pending the completion of the permanent agreement, M. Beck gave His Majesty's Government an assurance that the Polish Government would consider themselves under an obligation to render assistance to His Majesty's Government under the same conditions as those contained in the temporary assurance already given by His Majesty's Government to Poland."

HITLER'S RETORT TO THE ANGLO-POLISH AGREEMENT (*April 28*)

The German Government's answer to the Anglo-Polish agreement was revealed on April 28. On that day the German Government handed the Polish Government a note denouncing the German-Polish Agreement of January, 1934. On the same day Hitler made a speech to the Reichstag in which he attempted to justify this act of unilateral denunciation as follows :—

> " After the problem of Danzig had already been discussed several times some months ago, I made a concrete offer to the Polish Government ..... "
>
> " The Polish Government have rejected my offer and have only declared that they are prepared (1) to negotiate concerning the question of a substitute for the Commissioner of the League of Nations and (2) to consider facilities for the transit traffic through the Corridor."
>
> " The intention to attack on the part of Germany, which was merely invented by the international press, led as you know to the so-called guarantee offer and to an obligation on the part of the Polish Government for mutual assistance..... This obligation is contradictory to the agreement which I made with Marshal Pilsudski some time ago, seeing that in this agreement reference is made exclusively to existing obligations, that is at that time, namely, to the obligations of Poland towards France of which we were aware. To extend these obligations subsequently is contrary to the terms of the German-Polish non-aggression pact. Under these circumstances I should not have entered into this pact at that time, because what sense can non-aggression pacts have if one partner in practice leaves open an enormous number of exceptions .....
>
> I therefore look upon the agreement which Marshal Pilsudski and I at one time concluded as having been unilaterally infringed by Poland and thereby no longer in existence! "

HITLER DENOUNCES THE ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL AGREEMENT

In the same speech Hitler announced his decision to denounce the Naval Agreement concluded four years earlier with Great Britain. " Apart from this " (the colonial question), he said in an attempt to justify this further act of unilateral denunciation,

> " I have never advanced a claim which might in any way have interfered with British interests or have become a danger to the Empire and thus have meant any kind of damage to England. I have always kept within the limit

of such demands as are intimately connected with Germany's living space and thus the eternal property of the German nation. Since England to-day, both by the press and officially, upholds the view that Germany should be opposed under all circumstances, and confirms this by the policy of encirclement known to us, the basis for the Naval Treaty has been removed."

POLAND'S ANSWER TO HITLER (*May 5*)

In a memorandum to the German Government dated May 5, the Polish Government stated their position in the light of Hitler's action. They pointed out that for a month they had received no reply to their original counter-proposals of March 26 and

> " it was only on the 28th April, 1939, that they learnt from the Chancellor's speech and from the German Government's memorandum that the mere fact of the formulation of counter-proposals, instead of the acceptance of the verbal German suggestions without alteration or reservation, had been regarded by the Reich as a refusal of discussions.
>
> It is clear that negotiations in which one State formulates demands and the other is to be obliged to accept those demands unaltered are not negotiations in the spirit of the declaration of 1934 and are incompatible with the vital interests and dignity of Poland."
>
> " The Polish Government cannot accept such an interpretation of the declaration of 1934 as would be equivalent to a renunciation of the right to conclude political agreements with third States and, consequently, almost a renunciation of independence in foreign policy. The policy of the German Reich in recent years has clearly indicated that the German Government have not drawn conclusions of this sort from the declaration as far as they themselves were concerned. The obligations publicly accepted by the Reich towards Italy and the German-Slovak Agreement of March, 1939, are clear indications of such an interpretation by the German Government of the declaration of 1934 .....
>
> The Polish Government reject as completely without foundation all accusations regarding the alleged incompatibility of the Anglo-Polish Mutual Guarantee of April, 1939, with the Polish-German Declaration of 1934. This guarantee has a purely defensive character and in no way threatens the German Reich, in the same way as the Polish-French Alliance, whose compatibility with the Declaration of 1934 has been recognised by the German Reich..... "

It appears from the above that the Government of the German Reich had no justification for their unilateral decision to regard the declaration of 1934 as not binding. The pact was, indeed, concluded for ten years without any possibility of denunciation during that time..... "

M. BECK'S SPEECH (*May 5*)

The Polish attitude was further clarified in a speech made by M. Beck on the same day before the Polish Parliament. In this speech he explained the history of Danzig and pointed out that while " the population of Danzig is predominantly German, its livelihood and prosperity depend on the economic potential of Poland." He ended by repeating his Government's readiness to approach " objectively and with the utmost goodwill " any points raised for discussion by the German Government; but insisted that two conditions were necessary if the discussions were to be of any real value, namely, (1) peaceful intentions, (2) peaceful methods of procedure.

THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE

THE GORING INTERVIEW (*May 27*)

The effect of these events on the relations between Germany and Great Britain can be seen from the following report sent to Lord Halifax by the British Ambassador in Berlin :—

Berlin, May 28, 1939.

" My Lord,

I paid a short visit to Field-Marshal Goring at Karinhall yesterday.

2. Field-Marshal Goring, who had obviously just been talking to someone else on the subject, began by inveighing against the attitude which was being adopted in England towards everything German and particularly in respect of the gold held there on behalf of the National Bank of Czecho-Slovakia. Before, however, I had had time to reply, he was called to the telephone and on his return did not revert to this specific question. He complained, instead, of British hostility in general, of our political and economic encirclement of Germany and the activities of what he described as the war party in England, etc.

3. I told the field-marshal that, before speaking of British hostility, he must understand why the undoubted change of feeling towards Germany in England had taken place. As he knew quite well the basis of all the discussions between

Mr. Chamberlain and Herr Hitler last year had been to the effect that, once the Sudeten were allowed to enter the Reich, Germany would leave the Czechs alone and would do nothing to interfere with their independence. Herr Hitler had given a definite assurance to that effect in his letter to the Prime Minister of the 27th September. By yielding to the advice of his " wild men " and deliberately annexing Bohemia and Moravia, Herr Hitler had not only broken his word to Mr. Chamberlain but had infringed the whole principle of self-determination on which the Munich Agreement rested.

4. At this point the field-marshal interrupted me with a description of President Hacha's visit to Berlin. I told Field-Marshal Göring that it was not possible to talk of free will when I understood that he himself had threatened to bombard Prague with his aeroplanes, if Dr. Hacha refused to sign. The field-marshal did not deny the fact but explained how the point had arisen.....

5. I thereupon reminded Field-Marshal Göring that, while I had always appreciated the necessity for the Czechs, in view of their geographical position to live in the friendliest political and economic relations with Great Germany, he had personally assured me last October that this was all that his Government desired. The precipitate action of Germany on the 15th March which I again ascribed to the wild men of the party, had consequently, apart from everything and everybody else, been a great shock to me personally and had undone all that I had sought to achieve during my two years at Berlin. Moreover, however indifferent this might seem to him, I could not but regard the destruction of the independence of the Czechs as a major political error, even in Germany's own interests.

GÖRING'S EMBARRASSMENT

6. The field-marshal appeared a little confused at this personal attack on his own good faith, and assured me that he himself had known nothing of the decision before it had been taken. He would not, he said, have gone to San Remo if he had ; nor had his stay there profited him, as he had hoped, owing to the unexpected amount of work which had in consequence been thrust upon him. He then proceeded to give a somewhat unconvincing explanation..... of the German attempt to come to a satisfactory arrangement with the Czechs and of its failure owing to Czech obstinacy and the revival of what he called the Benes spirit as the result of American encouragement.

7. As my time was limited, I told Field-Marshal Goring that I was well aware of the reasons adduced by his Government to justify its action, but I thought it more important that he himself should understand the British point of view in consequence of it. As the result of the Prague *coup* His Majesty's Government and the British people were determined to resist by force any new aggression. No one desired an amiable arrangement between Germany and Poland in respect of Danzig and the Corridor more than ourselves. But, if Germany endeavoured to settle these questions by unilateral action such as would compel the Poles to resort to arms to safeguard their independence, we and the French as well as other countries would be involved, with all the disastrous consequences which a prolonged world war would entail, especially for Germany, etc.

A TIRADE

Field-Marshal Goring did not appear to question our readiness to fight and restricted his reply to an attempt to prove that circumstances in 1939 were different to those in 1914, that no Power could overcome Germany in Europe, that a blockade this time would prove unavailing, that France would not stand a long war, that Germany could do more harm to Great Britain than the latter to her..... that the Poles.....were not and never had been a really united nation..... etc. The field-marshal used, in fact, all the language which might be expected in reply to a statement that Germany was bound to be defeated. While I was perturbed at his reference to the unreality of Polish unity, which resembled the German arguments last year in regard to Czecho-Slovakia, he gave me the impression, by somewhat over-stating his case, of considerably less confidence than he expressed.

8. At the end of this tirade, moreover, he asked me whether England 'out of envy of a strong Germany' was really bent on war with her and, if not, what was to be done to prevent it. I said that nobody in their senses could contemplate modern war without horror, but that we should not shrink from it if Germany resorted to another act of aggression. If, therefore, war was to be avoided, patience was necessary and the wild men in Germany must be restrained. Admittedly present-day Germany was in a dynamic condition, whereas England was by tradition the land of compromise. But compromise had its limits, and I did not see how the situation could be saved unless his Government were prepared to wait in order to allow excited spirits to calm down again and negotiations to be resumed in a better atmosphere.

9. At this point Field-Marshal Goring remarked that if the Poles tried to seize Danzig nothing would stop the German from acting at once. As my time was short, I made no comment on this but continued that neither the Prime Minister nor yourself had yet abandoned hope of a peaceful solution either as between Germany and Poland or between Germany and Great Britain, but that everything now entirely depended on Germany's behaviour and actions.

THE VIRTUE OF PATIENCE

10. As I had already got up to go, the conversation then took a more amicable turn. Though I was in a hurry, he insisted on showing me with much pride the great structural alterations which he is making to the house at Karinhall and which include a new dining room to hold an incredible number of guests and to be all of marble and hung with tapestries. He mentioned incidentally that the rebuilding would not be completed before November. He also produced with pride drawings of the tapestries, mostly representing naked ladies labelled with the names of various virtues such as Goodness, Mercy, Purity, etc. I told him that they looked at least pacific, but that I failed to see Patience among them.

I have etc

NEVILE HENDERSON."

LORD HALIFAX AT CHATHAM HOUSE (*June 29*)

On June 16, Viscount Halifax again repeated to the German Ambassador in London that neither Great Britain nor any other Power was "encircling" Germany, and on June 29 he took the opportunity, in a speech at a dinner of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, to define at some length the attitude and policy of Great Britain.

"In the past," he said, "we have always stood out against the attempt by any single Power to dominate Europe at the expense of the liberties of other nations, and British policy is, therefore, only following the inevitable line of its own history, if such an attempt were to be made again."

"We are told that our motives are to isolate Germany within a ring of hostile States, to stifle her natural outlets, to cramp and throttle the very existence of a great nation. What are the facts? They are very simple and everybody knows them. Germany is isolating herself, and doing it most successfully and completely. She is isolating herself from other countries economically by her policy of

autarky, politically by a policy that causes constant anxiety to other nations, and culturally by her policy of racialism. If you deliberately isolate yourself from others by your own actions you can blame nobody but yourself, and so long as this isolation continues, the inevitable consequences of it are bound to become stronger and more marked. The last thing we desire is to see the individual German man, or woman, or child suffering privations; but if they do so, the fault does not lie with us, and it depends on the German Government and on the German Government alone whether this process of isolation continues or not, for any day it can be ended by a policy of co-operation. It is well that this should be stated plainly so that there may be no misunderstanding here or elsewhere."

"British policy," the Foreign Secretary concluded, "rests on twin foundations of purpose. One is determination to resist force. The other is our recognition of the world's desire to get on with the constructive work of building peace. If we could once be satisfied that the intentions of others were the same as our own..... then, I say here definitely, we could discuss the problems that are to-day causing the world anxiety..... But that is not the position which we face to-day. The threat of military force is holding the world to ransom, and our immediate task is .....to resist aggression. I would emphasise that to-night with all the strength at my command, so that nobody may misunderstand it."

DETERIORATION IN THE SITUATION AT DANZIG

(June 3-July 3)

With the increase of agitation in the Reich the local situation at Danzig rapidly became worse. On June 3 the President of the Danzig Senate made accusations against Polish customs inspectors. The Polish Government on June 10 replied with a denial of the accusations and a statement of the legal rights of Poland in relation to Danzig. On June 27 the Polish Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs told Sir H. Kennard, the British Ambassador in Warsaw, that a Freicorps was being formed in Danzig. Mr. Shepherd, the British Consul-General in Danzig, also reported upon military preparations in the city. On June 30, in view of the gravity of the situation, Viscount Halifax suggested consultation between the British, French and Polish Governments to prevent Hitler from manœuvring the Polish Government into a position where they would appear as aggressors. Meanwhile, the Polish Government maintained a restrained attitude.

BRITISH ATTITUDE TOWARDS DANZIG (*July 10-15*)

On July 10, while the situation at Danzig was becoming critical the Prime Minister defined the British attitude towards the Danzig problem in a statement in the House of Commons. He pointed out that it was before Poland had received any guarantee from Great Britain that the Polish Government, fearing to be faced with unilateral German action, had replied to the German proposals, by putting forward counter-proposals of their own. The cause of the Polish refusal to accept the German proposals was to be found in the character of these proposals and in the manner and timing of their presentation and not in the British guarantee of Poland.

On July 14 Sir Nevile Henderson discussed with Baron von Weizsacker, German State Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs; a statement by one of the German Under-Secretaries that "Herr Hitler was convinced that England would never fight over Danzig." Sir Nevile Henderson repeated the affirmation already made by the British Government that, in the event of German aggression, Great Britain would support Poland in resisting force by force.

LULL AT DANZIG (*July 19-August 2*)

During July there was a temporary lull in the situation. The acting British Consul-General at Danzig reported on July 19 that Forster, the leader of the National Socialist party in Danzig, had stated, after an interview with Hitler, that "nothing will be done on the German side to provoke a conflict," and that the Danzig question could "wait if necessary until next year or even longer." Forster repeated this statement a week later. On July 21 Viscount Halifax instructed Mr. Norton, the British Chargé d'Affaires at Warsaw, to impress upon the Polish Government the need for caution. M. Beck replied, on July 25, that the Polish Government were equally anxious for a *detente*.

THE SITUATION AT DANZIG WORSENS AGAIN (*August 4-16*)

On August 4 M. Beck told the British Chargé d'Affaires at Warsaw that the Danzig Senate had that day informed Polish customs inspectors at four posts in Danzig that henceforward they would not be allowed to carry out their duties. The Polish Government took "a very serious view" of this step. Similar news came from Mr. Shepherd at Danzig. On August 9 Sir H. Kennard reported that the Polish attitude was "firm but studiously moderate."

A day later, Sir H. Kennard reported to the British Government a communication made by the German Government to the Polish Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin on the Danzig question, and the Polish

reply. M. Beck drew the attention of Sir H. Kennard to "the very serious nature of the German *demarche* as it was the first time that the Reich had directly intervened in the dispute between Poland and the Danzig Senate." The Polish Government in their reply to the German *note verbale* stated that they would "react to any attempt by the authorities of the Free City which might tend to compromise the rights and interests which Poland possesses there in virtue of her agreements, by employment of such means and measures as they alone shall think fit to adopt, and will consider any future intervention by German Government to detriment of these rights and interests as an act of aggression."

Sir Nevile Henderson on August 15 discussed with Baron von Weizsacker the deterioration in the Danzig position, and pointed out that if the Poles "were compelled by any act of Germany to resort to arms to defend themselves there was not a shadow of doubt that we would give them our full armed support..... Germany would be making a tragic mistake if she imagined the contrary." Baron von Weizsacker himself observed that "the situation in one respect was even worse than last year as Mr. Chamberlain could not again come out to Germany." Baron von Weizsacker also discounted the character of Russian help to Poland and thought "that the U.S.S.R. would even in the end join in sharing in the Polish spoils."

Meanwhile, on August 11, M. Burckhardt, the League of Nations High Commissioner in Danzig, had a conversation with Hitler at Berchtesgaden at the latter's request, in which the question of Danzig and the European situation was discussed.

Lord Halifax, who still hoped that Hitler might avoid war, advised the Polish Government to make it clear that they remained ready for negotiations over Danzig.

THE GERMAN MINORITY IN POLAND

Sir H. Kennard reported that the German press campaign about the persecution of the German minority in Poland was a "gross distortion and exaggeration of the facts." On August 26 Sir H. Kennard reported frontier incidents which had been provoked by the Germans. They had not caused the Poles to change their "calm and strong attitude of defence."

THE AUGUST CRISIS

MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S LETTER TO HITLER

(August 22)

On August 22, after the publication of the news of von Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow to sign a non-aggression pact with the U.S.S.R., the Prime Minister sent a personal letter to Hitler. Mr. Chamberlain once again gave a clear statement of the British obligations to

Poland, and stated that "Whatever may prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet Agreement, it cannot alter Great Britain's obligation." He added that "It has been alleged that, if His Majesty's Government had made their position more clear in 1914, the great catastrophe would have been avoided. Whether or not there is any force in that allegation, His Majesty's Government are resolved that on this occasion there shall be no such tragic misunderstanding."

AN INTERVIEW WITH HITLER (*August 23*)

On August 23 Sir Nevile Henderson reported his first interview with Hitler earlier in the day. Hitler was "excitable and uncompromising"; his language was "violent and exaggerated both as regards England and Poland."

> "He began by asserting that the Polish question would have been settled on the most generous terms if it had not been for England's unwarranted support. I drew attention to the inaccuracies of this statement, our guarantee having been given on 31st March and Polish reply on 26th March. He retorted by saying that the latter had been inspired by a British press campaign, which had invented a German threat to Poland the week before. Germany had not moved a man any more than she had done during the similar fallacious press campaign about Czecho-Slovakia on the 20th May last year.
>
> He then violently attacked the Poles, talked of 100,000 German refugees from Poland, excesses against Germans, closing of German institutions and Polish systematic persecution of German nationals generally. He said that he was receiving hundreds of telegrams daily from his persecuted compatriots. He would stand it no longer, etc. I interrupted by remarking that while I did not wish to try to deny that persecutions occurred (of Poles also in Germany) the German press accounts were highly exaggerated. He had mentioned the castration of Germans. I happened to be aware of one case. The German in question was a sex-maniac, who has been treated as he deserved. Herr Hitler's retort was that there had not been one case but six.
>
> His next tirade was against British support of Czechs and Poles. He asserted that the former would have been independent to-day if England had not encouraged them in a policy hostile to Germany. He insinuated that the Poles would be to-morrow if Britain ceased to encourage them to-day. He followed this by a tirade against England, whose friendship he had sought for twenty years only to see every

offer turned down with contempt. The British press was also vehemently abused. I contested every point and kept calling his statements inaccurate but the only effect was to launch him on some fresh tirado."

"At the end of this first conversation Herr Hitler observed, in reply to my repeated warnings that direct action by Germany would mean war, that Germany had nothing to lose and Great Britain much; that he did not desire war but would not shrink from it if it was necessary; and that his people were much more behind him than last September.

I replied that I hoped and was convinced that some solution was still possible without war and asked why contact with the Poles could not be renewed. Herr Hitler's retort was that, so long as England gave Poland a blank cheque, Polish unreasonableness would render any negotiation impossible. I denied the 'blank cheque' but this only started Herr Hitler off again and finally it was agreed that he would send or hand me his reply in two hours' time."

Hitler was calmer at a second talk,—he "never raised his voice once,"—but no less uncompromising. He put the whole responsibility for war on Great Britain, and maintained that Great Britain was "determined to destroy and exterminate Germany. He was, he said, 50 years old; he preferred war now to when he would be 55 or 60." He said that "it was England who was fighting for lesser races, whereas he was fighting only for Germany."

The German reply to the Prime Minister's letter was given to the British Ambassador on August 23. Hitler stated that the British promise to assist Poland would make no difference to the determination of the Reich to safeguard German interests, and that the precautionary British military measures announced in the Prime Minister's letter of August 22 would be followed by the mobilisation of the German forces.

THE GERMAN-SOVIET NON-AGGRESSION PACT

(August 23)

On August 23 a 10-year Non-Aggression Pact was signed between Germany and Russia. They agreed not to attack one another; not to support a third Power that attacked the other and not to join any grouping of Powers directed directly or indirectly against the other; to keep in touch and consult together on questions touching their joint interests; and to clarify disputes or disagreements arising between them by friendly exchange of opinion or if necessary, by arbitration committees.

Speeches by Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax on August 24 made plain the unshaken determination of Great Britain to honour British obligations to Poland.

FORSTER APPOINTED HEAD OF THE STATE OF THE FREE CITY OF DANZIG (*August 23*)

Gauleiter Forster was declared by decree of the Danzig Senate, on August 23, Head of the State (Staatsoberhaupt) of the Free City of Danzig. The Polish Government protested to the Senate against the illegality of this appointment.

WORLD APPEALS TO SAVE PEACE

During these last days of August appeals for peace and offers of mediation, by letter and by radio, were made by President Roosevelt, by the King of the Belgians in the name of the Heads of States of Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Holland, Luxembourg, Norway and Sweden, by the Queen of Holland, by the Pope, and by Signor Mussolini.

THE POLISH GOVERNMENT TRIES TO GET IN TOUCH WITH THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT (*August 24*)

In view of the increasing tension in Danzig, M. Beck told Sir H. Kennard that he considered the situation " most grave," and that he had asked the Polish Ambassador in Berlin to seek an immediate interview with the German State Secretary. This interview could not, however, be arranged, since Baron von Weizsacker was at Berchtesgaden, but the Polish Ambassador had an interview in the afternoon of August 24 with Goring. The field-marshal regretted that " his policy of maintaining friendly relations with Poland should have come to nought and admitted that he no longer had influence to do much in the matter." The field-marshal hinted that Poland should abandon her alliance with Great Britain, and left the Polish Government with the impression that Germany was aiming at a free hand in Eastern Europe.

THE ANGLO-POLISH AGREEMENT SIGNED (*August 25*)

On August 25 the Anglo-Polish declaration of the previous May was converted into a 5-year Agreement of Mutual Assistance. The two Governments agreed that if either of them became engaged in hostilities with a European Power which attacked them or forced them to defend their independence, the other would immediately give all the help it could on lines established by their naval, military and air authorities.

A GERMAN MESSAGE TO LONDON (*August 25*)

On the morning of August 25 Hitler sent for Sir Nevile Henderson and asked him to fly to London to "put the case" to the British Government. The " case," which included an offer of friendship with Great Britain, once the Polish question had been solved,

was contained in a "verbal communication" made to the British Ambassador. Hitler was "ready to pledge himself personally" for the "continued existence" of the British Empire if his colonial demands were also fulfilled. During the interview Hitler "was absolutely calm and normal and spoke with great earnestness and apparent sincerity".

Sir Nevile Henderson stated once more that Great Britain "could not go back on her word to Poland" and would insist on a settlement by negotiation. Hitler refused to guarantee a negotiated settlement on the ground that "Polish provocation might at any moment render German intervention to protect German nationals inevitable." He said, "If you think it useless then do not send my offer at all."

The only signs of excitement on Hitler's part were when he referred to Polish persecutions. He said that the Poles fired at German aeroplanes and that there had been another case of castration.

> "Among various points mentioned by Herr Hitler were: that the only winner of another European war would be Japan; that he was by nature an artist not a politician, and that once the Polish question was settled he would end his life as an artist and not as a war-monger; he did not want to turn Germany into nothing but a military barracks and he would only do so if forced to do so; that once the Polish question was settled he himself would settle down; that he had no interest in making Britain break her word to Poland; that he had no wish to be small-minded in any settlement with Poland and that all he required for an agreement with her was a gesture from Britain to indicate that she would not be unreasonable.
>
> After I had left, Herr von Ribbentrop sent Dr. Schmidt to the Embassy with text of verbal statement and also a message from him to the effect that Herr Hitler had always and still wished for an agreement with Britain and begging me to urge His Majesty's Government to take the offer very seriously."

LORD HALIFAX SUGGESTS NEUTRAL OBSERVERS AND EXCHANGE OF POPULATIONS (*August 25*)

Sir Nevile Henderson's dispatch quoted above had been received at the Foreign Office at 7·0 P.M. At 11·0 that evening suggestions were sent to the Polish Government for the establishment of a corps of neutral observers, who would enter upon their functions if it were found possible to open negotiations. Lord Halifax later suggested the possibility of negotiating over an exchange of populations. M. Beck raised no objection in principle to either proposal.

THE BRITISH REPLY TO HITLER'S MESSAGE

(August 28)

On August 28 Viscount Halifax informed the Polish Government through Sir H. Kennard that in the British reply to Hitler " a clear distinction " would be drawn between " the method of reaching agreement on German-Polish differences and the nature of the solution to be arrived at. As to the method, we [His Majesty's Government] wish to express our clear view that direct discussion on equal terms between the parties is the proper means."

The reply of the British Government, suggesting direct discussion between the German and Polish Governments, was presented to Hitler by Sir N. Henderson on August 28. The British Government stated they had " already received a definite assurance from the Polish Government that they are prepared to enter into discussions," and that, if such direct discussion led, as they hoped, to agreement, " the way would be open to the negotiation of that wider and more complete understanding between Great Britain and Germany which both countries desire."

ANOTHER INTERVIEW WITH HITLER *(August 28)*

In this interview of August 28 with Hitler, Sir N. Henderson repeated the British readiness to reach an Anglo-German understanding, " but only on the basis of a peaceful and freely negotiated solution of the Polish question." Sir Nevile Henderson pointed out to Hitler that " If he was prepared to sacrifice that understanding " [between Britain and Germany] " in order to make war or immoderate demands on Poland, the responsibility was his. We offered friendship but only on the basis of a peaceful and freely negotiated solution of the Polish question."

> " Herr Hitler replied that he would be willing to negotiate if there was a Polish Government which was prepared to be reasonable and which really controlled the country." He " continued to argue that Poland could never be reasonable : she had England and France behind her, and imagined that even if she were beaten she would later recover, thanks to their help, more than she might lose. He spoke of annihilating Poland. I said that reminded me of similar talk last year of annihilation of the Czechs. He retorted that we were incapable of inducing Poland to be reasonable. I said that it was just because we remembered the experience of Czecho-Slovakia last year that we hesitated to press Poland too far to-day ".
>
> " Herr Hitler said that he had to satisfy the demands of his people, his army was ready and eager for battle, his people were united behind him . . . . . ,"

TWO STRAIGHT QUESTIONS

"In the end I asked him two straight questions. Was he willing to negotiate direct with the Poles and was he ready to discuss the question of an exchange of populations? He replied in the affirmative as regards the latter (though I have no doubt that he was thinking at the same time of a rectification of frontiers). As regards the first, he said he could not give me an answer until after he had given reply of His Majesty's Government the careful consideration which such a document deserved. In this connexion he turned to Herr von Ribbentrop and said: 'We must summon Field-Marshal Goring to discuss it with him'."

"At the end Herr von Ribbentrop asked me whether I could guarantee that the Prime Minister could carry the country with him in a policy of friendship with Germany. I said there was no possible doubt whatever that he could and would, provided Germany co-operated with him."

On August 29 the Prime Minister once more explained in the House of Commons the British standpoint.

HITLER DEMANDS A POLISH PLENIPOTENTIARY NEXT DAY

(August 29)

At 7-15 P.M. on August 29, Sir N. Henderson received from Hitler the German answer that the German Government were prepared to accept the British proposal for direct German-Polish negotiations, but counted on the arrival of a Polish plenipotentiary by August 30. The British Ambassador remarked that the latter demand "sounded like an ultimatum," but, after some heated remarks, both Hitler and von Ribbentrop assured the Ambassador "that it was only intended to stress urgency of the moment....." The interview was "of a stormy character." Sir N. Henderson thought that Hitler was "far less reasonable" than on August 28.

At two o'clock in the morning of August 30 Lord Halifax told Sir Nevile Henderson to expect the British reply that afternoon, and asked him to inform the German Government at once of the impossibility of producing a Polish representative in Berlin the same day. Sir Nevile reported that he had already pointed this out the evening before to Hitler, who had replied "that one could fly from Warsaw to Berlin in one and a half hours." The Ambassador added "one can only conclude ..... that Herr Hitler is determined to achieve his ends by so-called peaceful fair means if he can, but by force if he cannot.....if Herr Hitler is allowed to continue to have the initiative, it seems to me that result can only be either war or once again victory for him by a display of force and encouragement thereby to pursue the same course again next year or the year after."

AT WARSAW (*August 30*)

From Warsaw Sir Howard Kennard reported that, rather than submit to the humiliation of sending M. Beck or anyone else to Berlin to discuss a settlement on Hitler's terms, the Poles "would certainly sooner fight and perish ..... especially after examples of Czecho-Slovakia, Lithuania and Austria." Negotiations on equal terms were only possible on neutral ground or perhaps in Italy, and on the basis of a compromise between Hitler's March terms (see p. 7) and the *status quo*.

During the afternoon Lord Halifax asked Sir Howard to appeal to M. Beck for strict instructions to be given against provocation, and especially against persecuting the German minority, a similar appeal being made to Hitler. M. Beck gave the desired assurance but pointed out that German provocation in Danzig was becoming "more and more intolerable."

STEPS IN BERLIN (*August 30*)

Meanwhile Lord Halifax had notified Berlin that Polish restraint depended on German restraint and mentioned reports "that Germans have committed acts of sabotage which would justify the sternest measures." To this von Ribbentrop undiplomatically replied that British counsels of moderation in Warsaw "had had cursed little effect." Lord Halifax also criticised as "wholly unreasonable" the German insistence "that a Polish representative with full powers must come to Berlin to receive the German proposals," and suggested negotiations through normal channels. If the basis were reasonable the British Government would do their best to help.

THE BRITISH REPLY (*Midnight, August 30-31*)

At midnight on August 30 the British Ambassador handed von Ribbentrop the reply to Hitler's note of the night before. It expressed appreciation of Hitler's desire for Anglo-German understanding but pointed out that Britain "could not sacrifice the interests of other friends in order to obtain that improvement." Britain did not expect German vital interests to be sacrificed but believed them compatible with Polish interests.

The British Government noted Hitler's acceptance of the British position as to Poland's vital interests and independence, and the proposals for direct negotiations with Poland and for any settlement to be internationally guaranteed. They urged Hitler to approach the U.S.S.R. in the matter. They urged that Germany and Poland should undertake to refrain from aggressive military movements and to arrange a temporary *modus vivendi* for Danzig during discussion.

ADVICE TO M. BECK *(Early morning, August 31)*

Early next morning Sir Howard Kennard gave a copy to M. Beck, pointing out that Britain, like Poland, objected to much of what Hitler said but that there seemed to be some basis for the direct discussions which Poland had agreed to enter. British determination to implement obligations to Poland without reserve was understood in Berlin and gave a background for conversations. So long as Germany professed willingness to negotiate no opening should be given for putting on Poland the blame for a possible conflict.

TALKS WITH VON RIBBENTROP

(Midnight, August 30-31)

Meanwhile von Ribbentrop had seen Sir Nevile Henderson and "read out in German aloud at top speed" a long list of German terms for Poland, of which he refused the Ambassador a copy, saying that as a Polish representative had not reached Berlin by midnight on August 30 "it was now too late." Sir Nevile pointed out that this treatment was breach of the German assurance that no ultimatum was being given. "I must tell you," he reported to Lord Halifax, "that Herr von Ribbentrop's whole demeanour during an unpleasant interview was aping Herr Hitler at his worst."

THE POLISH ATTITUDE

In Warsaw urgent moves followed to make Berlin aware of Polish readiness for discussions. M. Beck agreed to instruct the Polish Ambassador to Germany to seek an interview, but would not authorise him to accept a statement of terms "as, in view of past experience, it might be accompanied by some sort of ultimatum....." He added that "if invited to go to Berlin he would of course not go, as he had no intention of being treated like President Hacha."

THE SIXTEEN POINTS *(Evening, August 31)*

The Polish Ambassador was not received by von Ribbentrop until the evening of August 31. Immediately afterwards the German Government broadcast their proposals. The Ambassador could not get through to Warsaw because the Germans had closed all communications, and the British Government also first heard Hitler's Sixteen Points on the radio, before they were handed over in a wordy message to Sir Nevile Henderson.

The message stated that Berlin had been ready to receive up to the evening of August 30 a Polish envoy "empowered not only to discuss but to conduct and conclude negotiations." The Führer had "waited two days in vain for the arrival of a Polish negotiator with plenary powers" and thus regarded his proposals as "to all

intents and purposes" rejected. He therefore thought it timely to inform the public of the sixteen points (which had been read at high speed, but not given, to the British Ambassador the previous evening). These were, in brief:—

1. *Return of Danzig to the Reich.*

2. *The Corridor to decide whether it will belong to Germany or Poland.*

3. *The Corridor to be immediately handed over by Poland to an Anglo-French-Italo-Russian international commission with sovereign rights, pending a plebiscite at which all who were born by or domiciled on January, 1, 1918, in the Corridor should have a vote.*

4. *The port of Gdynia to remain Polish.*

5. *The plebiscite not to be held for at least a year.*

6. *During this period free transit traffic to be secured to both Germany and Poland.*

7. *A simple majority of votes to decide the plebiscite.*

8. *If Poland wins, Germany to receive an extra-territorial traffic zone one kilometre wide for a 4-track railway and motorway to East Prussia. If Germany wins, Poland to have a similar communication to Gdynia.*

9. *If Germany wins, the Reich to exchange population with Poland to a suitable exent.*

10. *Any special Polish rights in Danzig to be balanced by special German rights in Gdynia.*

11. *Danzig and Gdynia to be demilitarised.*

12. *The Hela peninsula near Gdynia to be demilitarised, whether it goes to Poland or Germany under the plebiscite.*

13. *An international committee of enquiry to examine all complaints of economic or physical damage or acts of terrorism against minorities on either side since 1918. Germany and Poland to give compensation or make restitution.*

14. *A comprehensive reciprocal guarantee for the future rights of German and Polish minorities.*

15. *In the event of agreement, German and Polish demobilisation to follow immediately.*

16. *Further measures for rapid execution of the arrangement to be agreed on jointly by Germany and Poland.*

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

GERMANY STRIKES (*Dawn, September 1*)

At dawn on September 1, before either the Governments or the peoples of other countries had even had a chance to read this

interesting document, German troops crossed the Polish frontier. Bombers lost no time in bombing open towns and killing civilians who did not even know war had begun.

At 10-30 A.M. the Polish Ambassador in London told Lord Halifax officially that German forces had crossed the Polish frontier at four points. "He added" wrote Lord Halifax "that the towns of Vilno, Grodno, Brest-Litovsk, Lodz, Kutowice and Cracow were being bombed and that at 9 A.M. an air attack had been made on Warsaw, as a result of which there were many civilian victims, including women and children.....His Excellency said that he had few words to add, except that it was a plain case as provided for by the treaty. I said that I had no doubt on the facts as he had reported them that we should take the same view."

Sir Howard Kennard reported from Warsaw: "Minister for Foreign Affairs has just telephoned to me in the middle of an air raid to beg me to point out to your Lordship that various cases of armed German aggression, which have occurred this morning on Polish soil, cannot be taken longer as mere isolated cases but constitute acts of war."

Yet as late as 11-30 A.M. the German Chargé d'Affaires in London was denying to Lord Halifax that Warsaw and other towns were being bombed.

THE BRITISH WARNING TO BERLIN

(*September 1*)

That afternoon Mr. Chamberlain told the House of Commons the story of these happenings. "In these circumstances," he pointed out, "there is only one course open to us. His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin and the French Ambassador have been instructed to hand to the German Government the following document:—

> 'Early this morning the German Chancellor issued a proclamation to the German Army which indicated clearly that he was about to attack Poland. Information which has reached His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government indicates that German troops have crossed the Polish frontier and that attacks upon Polish towns are proceeding. In these circumstances it appears to the Government of the United Kingdom and France that by their action the German Government have created conditions, namely, an aggressive act of force against Poland threatening the independence of Poland, which call for the implementation by the Governments of the United Kingdom and France of the undertaking to Poland to come to her assistance. I am accordingly to inform your Excellency that unless the German Government are prepared to give His Majesty's Government satisfactory assurances that the German

Government have suspended all aggressive action against Poland and are prepared promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will without hesitation fulfil their obligations to Poland.'

An Hon. Member: "Time Limit?") If a reply to this last warning is unfavourable, and I do not suggest that it is likely to be otherwise, His Majesty's Ambassador is instructed to ask for his passports. In that case we are ready." The Prime Minister added:

"We have no quarrel with the German people, except that they allow themselves to be governed by a Nazi Government. As long as that Government exists and pursues the methods it has so persistently followed during the last two years, there will be no peace in Europe. We shall merely pass from one crisis to another, and see one country after another attacked by methods which have now become familiar to us in their sickening technique. We are resolved that these methods must come to an end. If out of the struggle we again re-establish in the world the rules of good faith and the renunciation of force, why, then even the sacrifices that will be entailed upon us will find their fullest justification."

HITLER IN THE REICHSTAG (*September 1*)

Also on September 1, Hitler addressed the Reichstag. "For months," he said "we have been suffering under the torture of a problem which the Versailles *Diktat* created – a problem which has deteriorated until it becomes intolerable for us. Danzig was and is a German city. The Corridor was and is German....."

After referring to his treatment of Austria, the Sudetenland, Bohemia and Moravia, he denied "that he who undertakes to carry out these revisions for himself transgresses a law, since the Versailles *Diktat* is not law to us." He alleged that "the minorities who live in Germany are not persecuted."

After accusing the Poles of terrorising Germans and of strangling Danzig, he came to the negotiations:—

"For two whole days," he said, "I sat with my Government and waited to see whether it was convenient for the Polish Government to send a plenipotentiary or not. Last night they did not send us a plenipotentiary, but instead informed us through their Ambassador that they were still considering whether and to what extent they were in a position to go into the British proposals. The Polish Government also said that they would inform Britain of their decision.

Deputies, if the German Government and its Leader patiently endured such treatment Germany would deserve only to disappear from the political stage. But I am wrongly judged if my love of peace and my patience are mistaken for weakness or even cowardice. I, therefore, decided last night and informed the British Government that in these circumstances I can no longer find any willingness on the part of the Polish Government to conduct serious negotiations with us."

He went on to thank Italy for an offer of help which, however, he did not intend to invoke. Declarations from the West could not make him hesitate. Germany asked nothing of the West, and regarded the frontier with France as final. With the new and welcome Russian pact as a safeguard against a repetition of 1914 he was determined to clear up (1) the Danzig question, (2) the Corridor question and (3) German-Polish relations. He promised:

"I will not war against women and children. I have ordered my air force to restrict itself to attacks on military objectives. If, however, the enemy thinks he can from that draw *carte blanche* on his side to fight by the other methods he will receive an answer that will deprive him of hearing and sight. This night for the first time Polish regular soldiers fired on our own territory. Since 5-45 A.M. we have been returning the fire and from now on bombs will be met with bombs."

HITLER NAMES HIS SUCCESSORS

After extolling his work in building up German military might he said :—

"I am asking of no German man more than I myself was ready throughout four years at any time to do. There will be no hardships for Germans to which I myself will not submit. My whole life henceforth belongs more than ever to my people. I am from now on just first soldier of the German Reich. I have once more put on that coat that was the most sacred and dear to me. I will not take it off again until victory is secured, or I will not survive the outcome. Should anything happen to me in the struggle then my first successor is Party Comrade Goring ; should anything happen to Party Comrade Goring my next successor is Party Comrade Hess. You would then be under obligation to give to them as Führer the same blind loyalty and obedience as to myself. Should anything happen to Party Comrade Hess, then by law the Senate will be called, and will choose from its midst the most worthy— that is to say the bravest—successor."

He ended with an appeal for stout hearts and sacrifice, and an assertion that :—

"a November 1918 will never be repeated in German history .....And I would like to close with the declaration that I once made when I began the struggle for power in the Reich. I then said: 'If our will is so strong that no hardship and suffering can subdue it, then our will and our German might shall prevail'."

HITLER'S PROCLAMATION TO THE GERMAN ARMY

(September 1)

Simultaneously Hitler addressed this proclamation to the German Army :—

"The Polish State has refused the peaceful settlement of relations which I desired, and has appealed to arms. Germans in Poland are persecuted with bloody terror and driven from their houses. A series of violations of the frontier, intolerable to a great Power, prove that Poland is no longer willing to respect the frontier of the Reich.

In order to put an end to this lunacy, I have no other choice than to meet force with force from now on. The German Army will fight the battle for the honour and the vital rights of reborn Germany with hard determination. I expect that every soldier, mindful of the great traditions of eternal German soldiery, will ever remain conscious that he is a representative of the National-Socialist Greater Germany. Long live our people and our Reich!"

The Nazi leader, Forster, the same morning proclaimed the return of Danzig to the Reich, and Hitler accepted it.

SIR NEVILE SEES RIBBENTROP

(9-30 P.M., September 1)

At 9-30 P.M. on September 1 Sir Nevile Henderson saw von Ribbentrop and handed him the message quoted in the Prime Minister's speech. He had been instructed, acting jointly with the French Ambassador, to ask for an immediate reply, and to explain, if asked, that the message "is in the nature of warning and is not to be considered as an ultimatum," although Lord Halifax told Sir Nevile that in fact "If the German reply is unsatisfactory the next stage will be either an ultimatum with time limit or an immediate declaration of war."

Ribbentrop, after reading the message, "said that he wished to state that it was not Germany who had aggressed Poland, that on the contrary, it was Poland who had provoked Germany for

a long time past; that it was the Poles who had first mobilised and that yesterday it was Poland that had invaded German territory with troops of the regular army."

"As I was leaving," Sir Nevile reported, "Herr von Ribbentrop gave me a long explanation of why he had been unable to give me text of German proposals two nights ago. I told him that his attitude on that occasion had been most unhelpful and had effectively prevented me from making a last effort for peace, and that I greatly deplored it.

He was courteous and polite this evening. I am inclined to believe that Herr Hitler's answer will be an attempt to avoid war with Great Britain and France, but not likely to be one which we can accept."

SUSPENSE (*September 2*)

On Saturday, September 2, M. Beck pointed out to the French and British Ambassadors the effects of German superiority in the air and hoped that Britain and France would enter the war as soon as possible and would be able to draw off a considerable proportion of the German aircraft from the eastern front.

The same morning the Italian Government, which had been seeking to bring about an international conference to be held on September 5 to review the Versailles Treaty, reported to Berlin that a conference was still possible if preceded by an armistice. Hitler in reply asked for 24 hours to mature and take his decision, and this request was passed on from Rome to Paris and London at 2 P.M. The French and British Governments gave Hitler the time asked for, and it was confirmed that the British warning was not an ultimatum.

The same afternoon the Prime Minister reported to Parliament that the German Chancellor had not yet replied, possibly owing to the Italian mediation proposals.

Great Britain would "be bound to take action unless the German forces are withdrawn from Polish territory," but "if the German Government should agree to withdraw their forces then His Majesty's Government would be willing to regard the position as being the same as it was before the German forces crossed the Polish frontier."

Mr. Chamberlain undertook not to prolong the discussion.

THE BRITISH ULTIMATUM AND THE GERMAN REPLY (*September 3*)

At 5 A.M. on Sunday, September 3, Lord Halifax instructed Sir Nevile Henderson to tell the German Government that unless they gave satisfactory assurances of suspending hostilities and withdrawing from Poland, to reach London by 11 A.M. British Summer Time, a state of war would exist between the two countries.

At 11-15 A.M. British people everywhere listened to Mr. Chamberlain's announcement of the outbreak of war. In the House of Commons the same day the Prime Minister, after announcing the latest developments, concluded "I trust I may live to see the day when Hitlerism has been destroyed and a liberated Europe has been re-established."

The German reply began by saying that "The German Government and the German people refuse to receive, accept, let alone to fulfil, demands in the nature of ultimata made by the British Government." It blamed Britain for "having prevented peaceful revision" and for having encouraged the Polish Government to "continue in their criminal attitude." The German people, it insisted, "do not intend to allow themselves to be ill-treated by Poles." Germany had desired "an understanding, indeed close friendship" with Britain and laid the blame for failure to reach it solely on British leaders.

In proclamations to the German people and the German army, Hitler denounced Britain as pursuing a policy of world conquest and "encirclement" of Germany. Only lack of unity had led to collapse in 1918 and "whoever offends against this unity need expect nothing else than annihilation as an enemy of the nation."

THE PRIME MINISTER'S BROADCAST TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE

(September 3)

The Prime Minister in his broadcast talk to the German people on September 3, summed up the situation :—

"German people—Your country and mine are now at war. Your Government has bombed and invaded the free and independent State of Poland, which this country is in honour bound to defend. Because your troops were not withdrawn in response to the Note which the British Government addressed to the German Government, war has followed.

With the horrors of war we are familiar. God knows this country has done everything possible to prevent this calamity. But now that the invasion of Poland by Germany has taken place, it has become inevitable.

You are told by your Government that you are fighting because Poland rejected your Leader's offer and resorted to force. What are the facts? The so-called 'offer' was made to the Polish Ambassador in Berlin on Thursday evening, two hours before the announcement by your Government that it had been 'rejected.' So far from having been rejected, there had been no time even to consider it.

Your Government had previously demanded that a Polish representative should be sent to Berlin within twenty-four hours to conclude an agreement. At that time the 16 Points subsequently put forward had not even been communicated to the Polish Government. The Polish representative was expected to arrive within a fixed time to sign an agreement which he had not even seen. This is not negotiation. This is a dictate. To such methods no self-respecting and powerful State could assent. Negotiations on a free and equal basis might well have settled the matter in dispute.

WHY BRITAIN IS CONCERNED—

You may ask why Great Britain is concerned. We are concerned because we gave our word of honour to defend Poland against aggression. Why did we feel it necessary to pledge ourselves to defend this Eastern Power when our interests lie in the West, and when your Leader has said he has no interest to the West? The answer is—and I regret to have to say it—that nobody in this country any longer places any trust in your Leader's word.

He gave his word that he would respect the Locarno Treaty; he broke it. He gave his word that he neither wished nor intended to annex Austria; he broke it. He declared that he would not incorporate the Czechs in the Reich; he did so. He gave his word after Munich that he had no further territorial demands in Europe; he broke it. He gave his word that he wanted no Polish provinces; he broke it. He has sworn to you for years that he was the mortal enemy of Bolshevism; he is now its ally.

Can you wonder his word is, for us, not worth the paper it is written on?

The German-Soviet pact was a cynical *volte face*, designed to shatter the Peace Front against aggression. This gamble failed. The Peace Front stands firm. Your Leader is now sacrificing you, the German people, to the still more monstrous gamble of a war to extricate himself from the impossible position into which he has led himself and you.

In this war we are not fighting against you, the German people, for whom we have no bitter feeling, but against a tyrannous and forsworn regime which has betrayed not only its own people but the whole of Western civilisation and all that you and we hold dear.

May God defend the right!"

HITLER AND HITLERISM:

SIR NEVILE HENDERSON'S REPORT

Such was the history of the events which ended in the outbreak of war. While they were still fresh in his mind, Sir Nevile Henderson, the British Ambassador in Berlin, recorded his first-hand impressions of them in his *Final Report on the circumstances leading to the termination of his mission to Berlin*, which has since been published as a White Paper (Cmd. 6115). This Report provides a study of the background without knowledge of which the previous history cannot be fully understood. For, as the Report points out, it is not the "last minute manœuvres which have the real importance, except in so far as they confirm the principles and demonstrate the methods and technique of Herr Hitler and of Nazism."

THE NATURE OF THE NAZI MOVEMENT

"Herr Hitler and National Socialism," the Report points out "are the products of the defeat of a great nation in war and its reaction against the confusion and distress which followed that defeat. National Socialism itself is a revolution and a conception of national philosophy. Contrary to democracy which implies the subordination of the State to the service of its citizens, Nazism prescribes the subordination of its citizens to the service of the State, an all embracing Moloch, and to the individual who rules that State.

So long as National Socialism remained an article for internal consumption, the outside world, according to its individual predilection, might criticise or sympathise or merely watch with anxiety. The government of Germany was the affair of the German people. It was not until the theory of German nationalism was extended beyond Germany's own frontiers that the Nazi philosophy exceeded the limits compatible with peace.

It would be idle to deny the great achievements of the man who restored to the German nation its self-respect and its disciplined orderliness. The tyrannical methods which were employed within Germany itself to obtain this result were detestable, but were Germany's own concern." As Sir Nevile Henderson points out, many of Herr Hitler's social reforms, such as the Labour Camps, were in spite of their complete disregard of personal liberty of thought, word or deed, on highly advanced lines. "Nor" he continues, "can the appeal of Nazism with its slogans so attractive to a not over-discerning youth be ignored. Much of its legislation in this respect will survive in a newer and better world, in which Germany's amazing power of organisation and the great contributions which she has made in the past to the sciences, music, literature and the higher aims of civilisation and humanity will again play a leading part.

HITLER AND THE PROBLEM OF GERMAN UNITY

Nor was the unity of Great Germany in itself an ignoble ideal. It had long been the dream of some of the highest-minded of German thinkers, and it must be remembered that even in 1914 Germany was still immature as a political concept. In spite of the potential political danger for its weaker neighbours of a national philosophy which could so easily be distorted and extended beyond its due and legitimate frontiers, the unity of Great Germany was a reality which had to be faced, no less than that other reality, the paramount economic importance of Germany in Eastern, Central and South-Eastern Europe. It was not the incorporation of Austria and the Sudeten Germans in the Reich " [in so far as it could be defended in accordance with the principle of self-determination] " which so much shocked public opinion in the world as the unscrupulous and hateful methods which Herr Hitler employed " to precipitate that incorporation.

HITLER'S " SICKENING TECHNIQUE "

That principle constituted the whole basis of the Munich agreement of September, 1938, which Hitler violated six months later, and thus, as Sir Nevile states, " In 1939, as in 1914, the origin of war with Germany has been due to the deliberate tearing up by the latter of a scrap of paper. To the iniquities of a system which employed the barbarism of the middle ages in its persecution of the Jews, which subjected Roman Catholic priests and Protestant pastors alike to the inhumanities of the concentration camp for obedience to their religious faith, and which crushed out, in a fashion unparalleled in history, all individual liberty within the State itself, was added the violation not only of international agreements freely negotiated, but also of that principle of self-determination which Herr Hitler had invoked with such insistence so long as it suited his own purpose to do so. Up to last March the German ship of State had flown the German national flag, and in spite of the ' sickening technique ' of Nazism it was difficult not to concede to Germany the right both to control her own destiny and to benefit from those principles which were accorded to others. On the 15th March, by the ruthless suppression of the freedom of the Czechs, its captain hoisted the skull and crossbones of the pirate, cynically discarded his own theory of racial purity and appeared under his true colours as an unprincipled menace to European peace and liberty.

Two of the less attractive characteristics of the German are his inability either to see any side of a question except his own, or to understand the meaning of moderation. It would have been understandable to argue that a hostile Bohemia in the centre of Germany was an untenable proposition. But Herr Hitler could see no mean between rendering the Czechs innocuous as a potential

enemy and destroying their liberty as an independent people. There is some surprising reason to believe that Herr Hitler himself was disagreeably and literally astonished at the reaction in Britain and the world generally, which was provoked by the occupation of Prague and his breach of faith with Mr. Chamberlain. But while he may have realised his tactical mistake, it did not deter him from prosecuting his further designs ..... Herr Hitler felt that it would not add much to the general execration of his aggression and ill-faith in March if he settled these two problems" [*i.e.*, Danzig and the Corridor, and Memel] "simultaneously with Prague. The Democracies were, he thought, so averse to war that they would accept any *fait accompli*. They would be less disturbed if everything was done at once. Thereafter, the agitation would, he anticipated, gradually subside until, after consolidating his gains, he was once more in a position to strike again."

HITLER AND GREAT BRITAIN

Hitler's calculation in this matter is characteristic of his whole attitude towards the Western Powers, and towards Great Britain in particular. That attitude is described by Sir Nevile in a comment on his interview with Hitler of August 29, during which he says that Hitler delivered "a brief and in my opinion quite honest harangue.....on the genuineness of his constant endeavour to win Britain's friendship, of his respect for the British Empire, and of his liking for Englishmen generally. I should like to state..... emphatically," continues Sir Nevile, "that Herr Hitler's constant repetition of his desire for good relations with Great Britain was undoubtedly a sincere conviction," naturally on his own terms, namely a completely free hand in Central Europe, and even so it may be that he only desired them just so long as he was occupied in that part of the world; but, as Sir N. Henderson continues, "He will prove in the future a fascinating study for the historian and the biographer with psychological leanings. Widely different explanations will be propounded, and it would be out of place and time to comment at any length in this despatch on this aspect of Herr Hitler's mentality and character. But he combined, as I fancy many Germans do, admiration for the British race with envy of their achievements and hatred of their opposition to Germany's excessive aspirations. It is no exaggeration to say that he assiduously courted Great Britain, both as representing the aristocracy and most successful of the Nordic races, and as constituting the only seriously dangerous obstacle to his own far-reaching plan of German domination in Europe. This is evident in *Mein Kampf*, and, in spite of what he regarded as the constant rebuffs which he received from the British side, he persisted in his endeavours up to the last moment. Geniuses are strange creatures, and Herr Hitler, among other paradoxes, is a mixture of long-headed

calculation and violent and arrogant impulse provoked by resentment. The former drove him to seek Britain's friendship and the latter finally into war with her. Moreover, he believes his resentment to be entirely justified. He failed to realise why his military-cum-police tyranny should be repugnant to British ideals of individual and national freedom and liberty, or why he should not be allowed a free hand in Central and Eastern Europe to subjugate smaller and, as he regards them, inferior peoples to superior German rule and culture. He believed he could buy British acquiescence in his own far-reaching schemes by offers of alliance with and guarantees for the British Empire. Such acquiescence was indispensable to the success of his ambitions and he worked unceasingly to secure it. His great mistake was his complete failure to understand the inherent British sense of morality, humanity and freedom."

"One of Herr Hitler's greatest drawbacks is that, except for two official visits to Italy, he has never travelled abroad. For his knowledge of British mentality he consequently relied on Herr von Ribbentrop as an ex-Ambassador to Britain, who spoke both French and English, and who had spent some years in Canada, and whom he regarded as a man of the world. If report be true Herr von Ribbentrop gave him consistently false counsels in regard to England, while his successes in other spheres induced Herr Hitler to regard him more and more as a second Bismarck, a conviction which Herr von Ribbentrop probably shared to the full."

THE TRAGEDY OF THE DICTATOR

"Even the most absolute Dictator is susceptible to the influence of his surroundings. Nevertheless Herr Hitler's decisions, his calculations, and his opportunisms were his own. As Field-Marshal Göring once said to me, 'when a decision has to be taken, none of us count more than the stones on which we are standing. It is the Führer alone who decides.'"

"I think there can be no doubt that Field-Marshal Göring himself would have preferred a peaceful solution, but in matters such as these it was Herr Hitler's decision which alone counted; and whatever Field-Marshal Göring himself might feel, he was merely the loyal and submissive servant of his master. Moreover, he had come down definitely on the side of peace a year before and it may have been difficult for him to adopt this course a second time."

"In my report on the events of 1938 I drew your Lordship's special attention to the far reaching unfortunate results of the Blomberg marriage. I am more than ever convinced of the major disaster which that—in itself—minor incident involved, owing to the consequent elimination from Herr Hitler's entourage of the more moderate and independent of his advisers, such as Field Marshal von Blomberg himself, Baron von Neurath, Generals

Fritsch, Beck, etc. After February of last year Herr Hitler became more and more shut off from external influences and a law unto himself.

People are apt, in my opinion, to exaggerate the malign influence of Herr von Ribbentrop, Dr. Goebbels, Herr Himmler and the rest. It was probably consistently sinister, not because of its suggestiveness (since Herr Hitler alone decided policy), nor because it merely applauded and encouraged, but because, if Herr Hitler appeared to hesitate, the extremists of the party at once proceeded to fabricate situations calculated to drive Herr Hitler into courses which even he at times shrank from risking. The simplest method of doing this was through the medium of a controlled Press. Thus what happened in September last year, was repeated in March this year, and again in August. Dr. Goebbels' propaganda machine was the ready tool of these extremists, who were afraid lest Herr Hitler should move too slowly in the prosecution of his own ultimate designs.

The 1938 stories of Czech atrocities against its German minority, were rehashed up almost verbatim in regard to the Poles. Some foundation there must necessarily have been for a proportion of these allegations in view of the state of excitable tension which existed between the two peoples. Excess of zeal on the part of individuals and minor officials there undoubtedly was—but the tales of ill-treatment, expropriation and murder were multiplied a hundredfold. How far Herr Hitler himself believed in the truth of these tales must be a matter for conjecture. Germans are prone in any case to convince themselves very readily of anything which they wish to believe. Certainly he behaved as if he did believe, and, even if one may give him the benefit of the doubt, these reports served to inflame his resentment to the pitch which he or his extremists desired."

THE THREAT OF WAR

"There were, in fact, for Herr Hitler only two solutions : the use of force, or the achievement of his aims by the display of force. 'If you wish to obtain your objective by force, you must be strong ; if you wish to obtain them by negotiation, you must be stronger still.' That was a remark which he made to a foreign Statesman who visited him this year, and it expresses in the concisest possible form the Hitler technique. It was exactly that which he displayed in September 1938. He was no more bluffing then than he was bluffing in August 1939. Up to the middle of August this year the fear of a war on two fronts, with Russia hostile or at least unfriendly, might possibly have deterred him and his military advisers from action against Poland. There was no Eastern front to give him cause for hesitation in 1938, and he could have counted then on Hungarian as well as Polish support in his nefarious plans for the dismemberment of Czecho-Slovakia. But for Munich he would

without a shadow of doubt have invaded that country on the 29th September last year, just as surely as he invaded Poland on the 1st September this year, and the war would have come eleven months earlier. In both cases the methods employed were identical : the gradual mobilisation of the German army over a period of months and its secret concentration at the appointed positions, whence the advance could begin at almost any moment and within a very few hours.

So it was again in 1939. If he could have secured his objectives by this display of force he might have been content for the moment, with all the additional prestige which another bloodless success would have procured for him with his own people. But it would only have been to start again once the world had recovered from the shock, and even his own people were beginning to be tired of these repeated crises. Millions of Germans had begun to long for a more peaceful existence. Guns instead of butter were becoming more and more unpopular except with the younger generation, and Hitler may well have wondered what might happen to his Nazi revolution if its momentum were allowed to stop. Moreover the financial and economic position of Germany was such that things could scarcely continue as they were without some form of explosion, internal or external. Of the two alternatives the most attractive from the point of view of his growing personal ambitions, and those of the clique which was nearest to him, was war.

It is scarcely credible that he would have acted as he did if bloody war, rather than a bloodless victory, had not seemed the fairer prospect for him. He had always meant to teach the Poles a lesson for what he regarded as their base ingratitude in refusing the ' generous ' demands which he had made to them in March. His only manœuvres since that date were with the object of creating circumstances favourable to his plans or of inducing Britain and France to abandon their Polish ally and to leave him a free hand in Central and Eastern Europe."

ADVICE OF THE SOLDIERS

" If anything did count, it was the opinion of his Military Advisers. I have always believed that it was they who, in the interests of Germany's strategical security recommended the establishment of the Protectorate over Bohemia. And again this August, it was they, I fancy, who told Herr Hitler that further delay would be fatal lest the seasonal bad weather in Poland might upset their calculations for her swift overthrow. The army grudged him even the week between the 25th August and the 1st September which his last attempt to secure British neutrality or at least goodwill had cost it.

Yet even so the advice of his soldiers was probably merely cover for the prosecution of Hitler's own plans. His impatience and precipitate action on that last day of August can scarcely have

been other than premeditated. All through the summer he had been waiting on events to turn in his favour and had been making his preparations to seize the opportunity, when it was offered to him. The Russian pact appeared to give him the advantage which he was seeking and thereafter there was no time to loose, if mud was not to be added to Poland's allies."

THE NAZI-SOVIET PACT

" The secret " [of the Russian pact] " which on the German side had been known to not more than a few persons, had been well kept. It had been realised that German counter-negotiations had been proceeding throughout the summer, but it was hoped that they had been abandoned after the actual arrival at Moscow of the French and British military missions.....The first impression in Berlin was one of immense relief, partly at the removal of the dreaded Russian air menace, but more particularly because, in the minds of a public which had been led to believe by Goebbels' propaganda that the British negotiations with the U.S.S.R. were really encirclement with a view to a preventive war, the conclusion of a Russo-German non-aggression pact meant that peace was assured, since Britain would not, it was told, fight for Danzig or Poland without Russian aid. Once more the faith of the German people in the ability of Herr Hitler to obtain his objective without war was reaffirmed."

Nazi propaganda was, however, throughout the summer, " on two entirely contradictory lines either of which was destined, according to the development of the situation, to serve Herr Hitler's purpose. The first spread the persistent report that Britain would never go to war for the sake of Danzig. It was calculated to undermine the confidence of the Poles and to shake the faith of the smaller Powers, as well as of the United States of America, in the determination of Britain to resist any further German aggression. The second represented Britain as resolved to make war at the first opportunity on Germany in any case and in order to crush her before she became a too formidable political and economic rival. Both were fallacies but the Germans are a credulous race, and since the first has failed, it is the latter argumentation which forms the basis of Germany's present war propaganda."

HITLER'S HESITATION

Sir Nevile shows that the firm stand maintained by Britain and France after the Moscow pact took the Nazis by surprise. " Herr von Ribbentrop flew back to Germany with the signed Russo-German Agreement and Herr Hitler returned to Berlin the night of the 24th August. I have some reason to believe—though I cannot confirm it—that the order for the German Army to advance into Poland was actually issued for the night of the 25th-26th August. It is difficult otherwise to find justification for the various orders

and arrangements which came into force on the 26th-27th August. In the afternoon of the 25th August itself all telephone communication between Berlin and London and Paris was unexpectedly cut off for several hours. The celebrations at Tannenberg were cancelled on the 26th and the Party Rally at Nuremberg on the 27th August ; all Naval, Military and Air Attachés at Berlin were refused permission to leave the city without prior authority being obtained from the Ministry of War. All German airports were closed from that date, and the whole of Germany became a prohibited zone for all aircraft except the regular civil lines. All internal German air services were also suspended. Moreover as from the 27th a system for the rationing of food-stuffs and other commodities throughout Germany came into force. That this latter and—for the public—depressing measure should have been adopted prior to the outbreak of war can scarcely be explained, except on the assumption that war should actually have broken out on the 26th August.

The fact may well be, as I imagine it was, that Herr Hitler had had in consequence of the Prime Minister's letter one last hesitation and countermanded the orders to his Army, whereas the other arrangements were allowed to proceed unchecked. But it was not the horrors of war which deterred him. He had unlimited confidence in the magnificent army and air force which he had recreated and he was certainly not averse to putting them to the test so far as Poland was concerned. In two months, he told me, the war in the East would be ended and he would then, he said, hurl 160 divisions against the Western Front if England was so unwise as to oppose his plans. His hesitation was due rather to one final effort to detach Britain from Poland."

THE PARTING OF THE WAYS

Looking back Sir Nevile points out that " The Ides of March constituted in fact the parting of the ways and were directly responsible for everything which happened thereafter. Thencoforward no small nation in Europe could feel itself secure from some new adaptation of Nazi racial superiority and jungle law. The Polish guarantee was followed by unilateral guarantees on Britain's part to Greece and Roumania as well as by an attempt on the part of the British and French Governments to induce the U.S.S.R. to join in a peace front against aggression, ill-faith and oppression. The Nazi Government, for its part and with considerable success in Germany, represented this attempt as a renewal of the alleged pre-war British policy of encirclement. As a war-cry for the German people it was exceedingly effective up to the signature of the Russo-German non-aggression pact on the 23rd August." Even the German people must have realised then that it was Poland, not Germany, that was being encircled.

But the fact remains that it was Hitler's treatment of the Czechs in March which rendered war inevitable. Thereafter, it proved possible to delay the outbreak, but not to prevent it. Prague was Hitler's Rubicon, and describing how the British Embassy left Berlin on the morning of Monday, the 4th September, Sir Nevile concludes :

" A small crowd collected round the Embassy before our departure, but unlike 1914 it evinced no single sign of hostility. Mr. Kirk " [the United States Chargé d'Affaires] " rendered me one more last service by driving me to the station in his own car. The streets of Berlin were practically deserted and there was nothing to indicate the beginning of a war which is to decide whether force is to be the sole arbiter in international affairs ; whether international instruments solemnly and freely entered into are to be modified, not by negotiation, but by mere unilateral repudiation ; whether there is to be any faith in future in written contracts ; whether the fate of a great nation and the peace of the world is to rest in the future in the hands of one man ; whether small nations are to have any rights against the pretensions of States more powerful than themselves ; in a word, whether government of the people by the people for the people is to continue in this world, or whether it is to be replaced by the arbitrary will and ambition of single individuals regardless of the peoples' will."

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